Apple Inc. spent the better part of a decade chasing an electric vehicle dream, only to slam the brakes in early 2024. In contrast, Chinese tech giants like Xiaomi and Huawei have shifted into high gear, successfully entering the electric vehicle (EV) market within just a few years. This stark divergence offers a case study in the technical, financial, and geopolitical forces shaping the global EV industry. Apple’s secretive Project Titan – once hyped as a potential “Apple Car” to rival Tesla – ultimately fizzled out, while China’s tech players leveraged homefield advantages in manufacturing, partnerships, and policy support to thrive. Below we delve into why Apple’s EV initiative failed (culminating in its February 2024 cancellation), and how Xiaomi and Huawei succeeded where Apple stumbled. Along the way, we’ll examine 2024–2025 EV market trends, China’s dominance in EV supply chains, Apple’s strategic pivot to AI, and the impact of U.S.-China decoupling on these developments.
Apple’s Project Titan: A Decade-Long Drive to Nowhere
Apple’s EV project, codenamed Project Titan, began around 2014 amid great secrecy and high hopes. Rumors envisioned a sleek Apple-designed electric, possibly self-driving, car that could redefine the auto industry. Yet by February 27, 2024 Apple executives officially canceled plans to release an autonomous EV, reassigning the project’s team to other divisions (notably AI initiatives). This marked a humbling end to a nearly ten-year effort that reportedly burned through billions of dollars without ever producing a commercial vehicle.
Project Titan’s collapse was due to a confluence of technical, financial, strategic, and supply chain challenges:
Technical Complexity and False Starts: Developing a car – especially a fully self-driving one – proved far harder than anticipated. Apple’s leadership oscillated on vision: at times aiming for a Tesla-like electric car, other times chasing a Google-style autonomous vehicle without steering wheel or pedals. One ambitious design to build a car with no steering wheel ultimately had to be abandoned as “not possible with current technology”. These dueling visions and resets led to multiple scrapped and rebooted designs over the years. The project cycled through executives and engineers, losing momentum with each pivot.
Financial and Market Viability Concerns: Apple is accustomed to high-margin, high-volume products, and the economics of the auto industry looked unfavorable. Internally, there were fears that the profit margins on an electric car wouldn’t justify the massive investment. Indeed, Project Titan was costing Apple roughly $1 billion per year in R&D. Analysts projected an Apple Car would need to be priced around $100,000 – an “astronomical” price that would severely limit sales. Apple ultimately concluded that projected sales wouldn’t recoup the investment, especially in an EV market already crowded with well-established players by the mid-2020s. This poor ROI calculus weighed heavily in the decision to pull the plug.
Strategic Drift and Leadership Turnover: Unlike the focused, founder-led efforts of some rivals (as we’ll see with Xiaomi), Apple’s car project suffered from shifting goals among its leadership. There were “dueling views among leaders about what an Apple car should be”, causing major directional changes. Over the years, several project heads came and went, including veteran Apple executives and notable hires from the auto industry, leading to inconsistent execution. Apple CEO Tim Cook never publicly confirmed the car project and was reportedly skeptical at times. This lack of a clear, consistent champion within Apple’s top ranks contributed to the project’s stagnation.
Manufacturing & Supply Chain Obstacles: Building cars is a far cry from building iPhones. Apple had no in-house automotive manufacturing capability, and making a car requires a vast supply chain for components like batteries, motors, chassis, and chips. Initially, Apple sought an automaker partner – it held talks with the likes of Volkswagen, Hyundai-Kia, Nissan, BMW, and Mercedes-Benz at various points. The closest it came was a plan for Mercedes-Benz to manufacture the Apple Car while Apple provided the self-driving tech and user interface, but Apple walked away over disagreements on who would control the user experience and data. Apple’s insistence on controlling the “soul” of the product (software and UX) clashed with automakers’ domain expertise in building vehicles, and ultimately no manufacturing partnership materialized. By the late 2010s, Apple even considered acquiring an automaker (from Tesla to McLaren) but deemed integrating a car company into Apple’s culture would be disastrous. Lacking a partner, Apple faced the daunting prospect of setting up its own car production from scratch – a supply chain nightmare. This challenge was amplified by geopolitics: Apple would have likely needed to build in or source many parts from China (the global hub of EV components), at a time when U.S.-China relations were deteriorating (more on that shortly).
Timeline and Market Timing: In classic Apple fashion, the project aimed for a breakthrough (a fully autonomous, revolutionary vehicle) rather than a quick entry with a conventional EV. This prolonged development meant Apple kept missing self-imposed deadlines – Reuters in late 2020 suggested a 2024 launch target, which then slipped further per analysts. By 2023, it was clear Apple was still years away from a product. The EV market, meanwhile, was not waiting. Tesla, BYD, and others surged ahead, and by the mid-2020s even legacy automakers had dozens of EV models on the road. Apple risked entering very late into a market reaching saturation in key segments. Indeed, by early 2024 the global EV market’s growth was beginning to moderate from its once breakneck pace. The specter of being an also-ran in a maturing industry – as opposed to a pioneer redefining a nascent market – further undercut Apple’s enthusiasm.
In the end, Apple’s top brass decided the company’s resources were better spent elsewhere. In February 2024, hundreds of Project Titan employees were abruptly informed that the effort was over and they’d be reassigned – many moving to Apple’s Artificial Intelligence and robotics teams. Some employees were laid off (over 600 roles in California were cut as a direct result of the project’s shutdown). Apple even canceled its permits for self-driving car testing on California roads by late 2024, a further signal that Titan was well and truly shelved.
Apple’s retreat, while rare for the company, echoed its decision to cancel other over-ambitious projects (like the AirPower charger that was scrapped in 2019 due to engineering difficulties). It also reflected Apple’s core business logic: enter only those markets where it believes it can deliver a premium product at high margins. The auto industry in 2024 no longer fit that description for Apple. As one AppleInsider analysis put it, “with an electric vehicle, the price would have been astronomical,” and the margins razor-thin by Apple standards.
Pivot to Generative AI and Other Initiatives
Apple’s EV exit wasn’t just a retreat; it was also a pivot. The timing in early 2024 was no coincidence: this was the dawn of the generative AI boom, with technologies like ChatGPT capturing the world’s imagination. Apple’s leadership chose to reallocate the Titan team’s expertise in sensors, autonomy, and systems to its AI and machine learning efforts. Internal resources were shifted to “Apple Intelligence” projects – a broad initiative to imbue Apple’s products with more advanced AI, from Siri improvements to new smart home devices. In essence, Apple traded a moonshot in transportation for a redoubled focus on the AI arms race happening in tech.
This strategic shift was hinted at by Bloomberg and other outlets at the time: Apple canceled the car to “focus on generative AI” and related technologies. Indeed, many technical learnings from the car project (in autonomous systems, chips, and sensors) are being repurposed. For example, Apple’s development of sophisticated processors for self-driving (one Apple car chip was nearly finished and said to equal four M2 Ultra chips in power) will now bolster its AI hardware. Elements of Titan have spun off into robotics projects and enhanced vehicle integration in Apple’s existing ecosystem (like an evolved Apple CarPlay for partner automakers). Even Apple’s work on its AR/VR headset (Vision Pro) benefited from Titan’s technology, such as advanced real-time imaging processors originally meant for autonomous driving.
From a high-level perspective, Apple’s leadership (including CEO Tim Cook) likely recognized that AI was a more natural arena for Apple’s competitive strengths (silicon, software, services) than building cars. The opportunity cost of continuing to pour money and talent into an EV – versus seizing the moment in AI to catch up with rivals like Google, Microsoft, and OpenAI – became too high. In short, 2024 saw Apple “shift gears” from EVs to AI, leaving the automobile dreams to others.
Why pivot to AI? Because Apple thrives on ecosystem control and profit margins. EVs are hardware-intensive, capital-hungry, and fiercely competitive. AI, by contrast, integrates directly with Apple’s core products—Siri, iOS, macOS, and Apple Silicon. Apple saw more promise in investing in on-device generative AI, where it can preserve user privacy, reduce reliance on cloud infrastructure, and differentiate through hardware-software synergy.
The pivot wasn’t just strategic—it was cultural. AI is software-first, leaner to develop, and doesn’t rely on vast physical infrastructure. It also plays well with Apple’s core mission of building personal, empowering technology.
Global EV Market Boom (2024–2025) and China’s Dominance
Apple’s EV foray might have stalled, but globally the electric vehicle market has been in overdrive. By 2024, EVs went from niche to mainstream, driven by improving technology and aggressive climate policies worldwide. Global EV sales hit record levels in 2023 and 2024: nearly 14 million electric cars were sold in 2023, accounting for almost one in five cars sold (20%) that year. And the growth continued into 2024 – electric car sales topped 17 million worldwide in 2024, rising by over 25% year-on-year. In other words, just the increase in EV sales from 2023 to 2024 (an extra ~3.5 million vehicles) was greater than the total EV sales of the entire world only a few years prior. The trajectory is clear: EVs are rapidly becoming the default choice for new car buyers in major markets.
China is the juggernaut of this EV boom. China has the world’s largest and most dynamic EV market, and in 2024 it dominated global numbers. An estimated 11 out of the 17 million electric cars sold globally in 2024 were sold in China alone. In other words, China accounted for roughly 65% of global EV sales that year. This reflects how aggressively China has pursued electrification – through consumer incentives, charging infrastructure rollout, and support for domestic EV brands – and how enthusiastically Chinese consumers have embraced these vehicles. By comparison, Europe and the United States made up most of the remaining 35% of 2024 sales, with Europe ahead of the U.S. (Europe’s EV adoption has also been strong, reaching about 20% of new sales in 2023, while the U.S. trailed with EVs at around 7-8% of new sales in 2023, though growing fast).
Crucially, China not only leads in consuming EVs, but also in producing them – by a huge margin. In 2024, China was on track to manufacture nearly 2 out of every 3 electric cars made worldwide. In fact, projections indicated that China would account for 62% of global EV production in 2024. This is a staggering figure that underscores how China has become the factory floor for the EV revolution. For comparison, the United States and Europe lag far behind in EV production capacity, despite efforts to boost local manufacturing.
Several trends defined the global EV landscape in 2024–2025:
Continued Growth with Regional Differences: EV sales are still rising rapidly, though the rate varies. The U.S. and Europe saw over 40% growth in EV sales in 2023, slightly outpacing China’s ~35% growth (China’s base is larger). Emerging markets also started to pick up pace in EV adoption (helped by cheaper models and two-wheeler electrification). While there are concerns of EV markets cooling in some regions as early adopter demand saturates, supportive policies (like stricter emissions standards and incentives) are keeping the momentum. By 2025, global EV sales are expected to comfortably exceed 20 million units annually, continuing the trend toward EVs becoming a sizable share of all car sales.
Battery Demand and Supply Chains Under Pressure: The surge in EVs has created corresponding demand for lithium-ion batteries. Global battery demand for EVs exceeded 750 GWh in 2023, up 40% from 2022. This has spurred a worldwide race to secure battery materials (lithium, nickel, cobalt) and ramp up cell production. Once again, China is ahead of the pack – not just assembling cars but making the batteries that power them. In 2023, China’s battery demand (driven by its EV sales) was around 415 GWh, far larger than Europe’s 185 GWh or the U.S.’s ~100 GWh demand. Chinese EVs increasingly use LFP (lithium iron phosphate) batteries, a cost-effective chemistry that Chinese firms have perfected – about two-thirds of EVs sold in China in 2023 had LFP batteries, a much higher share than in the West. This trend plays to China’s strength, as Chinese companies lead in LFP technology and production.
Legacy Automakers vs. New Entrants: By 2024, nearly every traditional automaker (from GM and Ford to VW and Toyota) had committed tens of billions to EV development. Many new EV models launched, intensifying competition. Yet interestingly, new entrants and startups have captured significant market share, especially in China. Companies like BYD, Nio, Xpeng, Li Auto, and others in China have become major players. Globally, Tesla remained a leader, but it’s increasingly challenged by this wave of competitors. The result is fierce price competition – e.g., a “price war” in China in 2023–2024 saw Tesla and local brands slashing prices to attract buyers. This hyper-competitive environment favors companies that can leverage cost-efficient supply chains and scale quickly – another reason Apple may have thought twice about jumping in late.
Charging and Infrastructure Scaling: Along with car sales, the charging infrastructure is scaling up. China again leads with over 2.7 million public EV chargers installed by early 2024 – more than the rest of the world combined. This extensive charging network in China has been a key enabler for mass EV adoption (one of many benefits of Beijing’s top-down support for EVs). Other countries are also investing in charging (e.g., the U.S. with federal programs for highway fast chargers), but infrastructure build-out remains uneven globally. A robust charging network is a competitive advantage for EV uptake, and China’s head-start here provides a friendly environment for its EV companies.
In summary, by mid-2020s the global EV market is robust and growing, but it is also extremely competitive and increasingly bifurcated by geography. China’s dominance is a recurring theme – not just in sheer sales or production volume, but also in the entire value chain of EVs. This dominance did not happen by accident, as we explore next.
China’s Command of the EV Supply Chain and Battery Manufacturing
One of the most pivotal factors in the success of Chinese EV companies (and the struggles any foreign entrant would face) is China’s stranglehold on the EV supply chain – especially batteries, the heart of an electric car. Batteries typically account for up to 40% of an EV’s value, and producing them at scale cheaply is key to making affordable electric cars. Here, China has built an almost unassailable lead.
Consider the global battery manufacturing landscape in 2024:
The world’s largest battery producer is China’s CATL (Contemporary Amperex Technology Co. Ltd.), which by itself had 37.9% of the global EV battery market in 2024, up from ~36% the year before. CATL’s battery installations in EVs for 2024 totaled roughly 339 GWh, an enormous output. It supplies not only Chinese automakers (such as Zeekr, Li Auto, and the Huawei-associated Aito brand) but also international brands like Tesla, BMW, and VW.
The number two battery maker is another Chinese firm, BYD, which had 17.2% of the global battery market in 2024. BYD uniquely makes batteries and also uses them in its own popular EVs (BYD is now China’s largest EV automaker as well). BYD’s dual role has helped it innovate and secure supply for its vehicles; it produced ~154 GWh of batteries in 2024.
Together, CATL and BYD controlled ~55% of the world’s EV battery supply in 2024. The rest of the market is fragmented among South Korea’s LG Energy Solution (~11% share), Japan’s Panasonic (~4%), and a host of smaller players, many of them Chinese (CALB, Gotion, EVE, etc.). In fact, of the top 10 battery manufacturers globally, at least six are based in China. Over 70% of global EV battery production capacity is located in China by recent estimates.
Beyond batteries, Chinese firms also dominate the materials supply chain: refining of lithium, cobalt, and nickel (critical battery minerals) is overwhelmingly done in China. For instance, China processes a majority of the world’s lithium for batteries. An Australian think tank found Chinese institutions produced 65% of high-impact research papers on batteries, indicating not just manufacturing might but also innovation leadership. Moreover, Chinese companies hold a growing share of battery patents.
What does this dominance mean in practice? China’s EV manufacturers have a home-field advantage in accessing the most important (and expensive) component of an EV. They benefit from local suppliers, shorter supply lines, and lower costs due to economies of scale. Battery prices dropped significantly in recent years, thanks in part to Chinese mass production and overcapacity (by 2023, China had huge excess capacity in battery cell and material production, which drove prices down). While Western automakers scramble to build “gigafactories” in Europe and North America, Chinese companies already have mature battery supply networks at their doorstep.
This is one major reason even companies with no car-making history in China can quickly get into the EV game: the components and expertise are readily available. As one analysis noted, “with a robust supply chain churning out advanced components, even companies with no automotive legacy can, with sufficient resources, make and deliver advanced vehicles”. The heavy lifting of industrial infrastructure – from battery packs to electric motors and power electronics – can be handled by China’s extensive network of suppliers.
Additionally, China’s dominance extends to other parts of the EV ecosystem: electric motors, power semiconductors, charging hardware, and more. Many of these components are produced at scale in China’s manufacturing hubs. Coupled with the government’s support (subsidies, policy incentives, and protection for domestic players), this means Chinese EV makers operate in an environment where supply-side bottlenecks are minimal. They can focus on design, branding, and user experience, confident that the “nuts and bolts” of the vehicle are accessible.
Supply Chain Contrast – Apple vs. China: It’s instructive to contrast Apple’s position with that of a Chinese tech firm entering EVs. Apple would have had to either import many parts or invest in supply chain capacity abroad, both expensive propositions. Moreover, geopolitical tensions meant importing Chinese batteries (the cheapest option) into the U.S. or Europe is increasingly fraught (due to tariffs and regulations we discuss later). A Chinese company like Xiaomi, by contrast, can tap CATL for batteries, a myriad of local factories for parts, and assemble vehicles in China with relative ease. The entire supply chain is in the neighborhood – a huge competitive edge.
In fact, the speed with which Xiaomi built its EV capabilities underscores this advantage. Xiaomi announced its EV venture in 2021 and, by late 2023, had a car rolling off the line (a timeline that would be almost unthinkable outside China). A key enabler was likely its ability to source components domestically and quickly. Xiaomi’s first car uses batteries from CATL and a Xiaomi-designed electric motor (manufactured with Chinese supply partners). Huawei’s EV endeavors similarly leverage Chinese suppliers; for instance, the Aito vehicles use CATL batteries and Huawei’s in-house electronics, all integrated within China.
Finally, one cannot overlook China’s focus on innovation and improvement in EV tech. It’s not just about cheap labor or resources. Chinese companies are pioneering advancements such as new battery chemistries (e.g., sodium-ion batteries, semi-solid state designs), faster manufacturing techniques, and software-defined vehicle features. Chinese EV firms are reportedly able to develop new car models about 30% faster than legacy Western automakers. The ecosystem in China – from universities pumping out battery research to thousands of EV startups – creates a ferment of innovation. All this means that China’s dominance is not purely in volume but increasingly in know-how as well. This level of command over the EV supply chain and technology stack is one of the fundamental reasons Chinese tech companies have thrived in the EV sector, as we examine next with Xiaomi and Huawei.
Xiaomi and Huawei: Born in the Dragon’s Den
While Apple backed out, Chinese tech giants stepped in. Xiaomi’s SU7 electric sedan and Huawei’s partnerships with Chery and Seres have demonstrated how tech brands can thrive in the EV space. Why them?
- Local Supply Chains: Both firms leveraged China’s dense, mature supply chain for batteries, motors, chips, and chassis.
- Government Backing: Chinese EV firms benefit from policy support, incentives, and preferential local treatment.
- Vertical Integration: Xiaomi and Huawei moved quickly to integrate design, software, and hardware—including operating systems.
- Strategic Alliances: Rather than go it alone, they partnered with traditional automakers, gaining fast access to scale and know-how.
Chinese Tech Giants Charge Ahead: Xiaomi and Huawei’s EV Strategies
If Apple’s story was one of overreaching in a foreign domain, the story of Xiaomi and Huawei in EVs is one of playing to strengths and leveraging a favorable ecosystem. Both companies are relative newcomers to the car business (neither had made a car as of a few years ago), yet by 2024–2025 they have made significant strides – Xiaomi by building cars itself, and Huawei by partnering to co-produce cars with its technology inside. Their success highlights how Chinese tech firms have built competitive advantages in manufacturing, partnerships, market timing, and regulatory alignment to crack the EV market.
Xiaomi’s All-In EV Bet: From Smartphones to Sedans
When Xiaomi, best known as a smartphone maker, declared in March 2021 that it was entering the EV arena, many observers were skeptical. Yet Xiaomi’s billionaire founder and CEO Lei Jun was deadly serious – he often said that this would be his last major venture, pouring his reputation and resources into it. Xiaomi committed to investing $10 billion over 10 years into its electric car business, and Lei Jun himself took on the role of CEO of the new Xiaomi EV unit. This level of all-out commitment set the tone for what followed.
A mere three years later, in early 2024, Xiaomi rolled out its first electric car, a stylish sedan called the Xiaomi Modena (also known as the SU7). The speed of execution was remarkable – what took Apple a decade (with no car to show) took Xiaomi around 36 months to achieve with an actual production vehicle. And Xiaomi’s EV business quickly gained traction:
Xiaomi’s first electric car, the SU7 sedan, on display at a tech event in 2024. The smartphone maker entered the auto market in record time, leveraging its consumer electronics expertise and China’s EV supply chain.
Strong Debut Sales: Xiaomi’s SU7 was formally unveiled in late December 2023 and open for orders by early 2024. Chinese consumers responded enthusiastically. Deliveries of the SU7 began in spring 2024 (late March), and by September 2024 the SU7 had sold 70,000 units despite production only ramping up in April. By the end of 2024, Xiaomi had reportedly delivered over 100,000 SU7 sedans, and the momentum carried into 2025. In total, Xiaomi announced it had delivered 200,000 EVs within the first year of production (from 2024 into early 2025). This is a stunning number for a newcomer, indicating product-market fit. Buoyed by demand, Xiaomi raised its 2025 sales target to 350,000 EVs (up from 300k). For context, this would make Xiaomi one of the larger EV makers in China, in the league of some more established automakers.
High-End Positioning and “Blockbuster” Product Strategy: Xiaomi didn’t enter at the bottom of the market; it positioned the SU7 in the mid-to-high end (starting around 215,900 yuan, roughly $30k, and going up for higher trims). Lei Jun made clear they aimed to compete with premium EVs – he explicitly benchmarked Tesla and Porsche as the standards. The rationale was that the high-end segment, though competitive, allowed Xiaomi to showcase its technology and brand while avoiding the brutal low-end price wars. The SU7 was loaded with tech: an in-house “Xiaomi Pilot” autonomous driving system, a sleek digital cockpit, and performance akin to sporty sedans. Xiaomi followed a “single flagship model” approach: focus on making one excellent car first, much like they would concentrate on a flagship phone. This parallels Xiaomi’s typical electronics strategy of launching “爆品” (爆款) – blockbuster products that win on value and specs. The strategy worked: the SU7 became a bestseller in its category, validating Xiaomi’s gamble.
Manufacturing Mastery (with a Little Help): One might wonder how Xiaomi, with no car factories initially, managed to produce vehicles so fast. The company built its own “Xiaomi Auto” factory in Beijing, an ultra-modern plant with reportedly a capacity of 150,000 cars/year in phase one (scalable up to 300,000). Xiaomi’s knack for efficient manufacturing (honed in smartphones) likely carried over – emphasis on automation, integrated supply chain, and cost control. Reports described Xiaomi’s EV factory as a “super factory” that was constructed and operational in a short time frame. Additionally, Xiaomi wisely hired automotive veterans and engineers from established brands to ensure it respected industry fundamentals. Lei Jun emphasized “reverence for the automotive industry” – learning the craft properly rather than assuming tech skills alone were enough. Xiaomi benchmarked against the best (even tearing down competitors’ cars to learn). This blend of humility and ambition meant Xiaomi avoided naive mistakes; it didn’t try to reinvent basic car components but rather focused on integrating them better.
Synergies with Xiaomi’s Ecosystem: Xiaomi leveraged its existing strengths wherever possible. For instance, the company has a vast IoT (Internet of Things) ecosystem of smart home devices, and it integrated that with its car – appealing to customers who can seamlessly connect their Xiaomi phone, smart home, and car. Its retail network (thousands of Xiaomi stores and authorized dealers in China) became a channel to showcase and sell the car, providing instant nationwide reach. Xiaomi’s brand, known for value and innovation among Chinese consumers, gave it credibility in a way few startups could dream of. As one JPMorgan analyst noted, *“we vote for Xiaomi because it is already a well-known consumer tech brand and has a strong cash reserve… These advantages are rare assets for electric car makers in China.”*. In short, consumers trusted that Xiaomi had the financial muscle to sustain an EV business and deliver on software updates and support.
Founder-Led Focus: A critical intangible cited by Lei Jun is that Xiaomi’s EV push was personally led by him with full buy-in from the company’s leadership. Unlike Apple’s project which reportedly suffered internal debates, Xiaomi went all-in with unified focus. Lei Jun publicly declared “we will go all out” and made the EV project a do-or-die mission for the company. This galvanized the team and partners – there was a clear goal and no second-guessing from management. In an anecdote, Lei Jun contrasted his usual “stealth mode” approach for new ventures (quietly try and back off if it fails) with the very public commitment Xiaomi made to the car: there was no going back. This level of commitment is likely a big reason Xiaomi hit its aggressive timelines.
By mid-2025, Xiaomi’s EV venture appears to be a success in the making. The company even unveiled a second model, the Xiaomi YU7 SUV, in 2025, aiming to broaden its lineup. Early interest in the YU7 was high, reportedly even higher than for the first sedan launch. If Xiaomi can maintain quality and scale production, it’s poised to become a notable player in the EV world. It effectively demonstrated how a tech company can transition into heavy manufacturing by leveraging China’s unique ecosystem – abundant suppliers, government backing (Beijing was supportive, even offering incentives for Xiaomi’s factory), a huge domestic market, and a bit of copied homework from auto veterans.
Huawei’s “Tech Inside” Approach: Partnering for Success
While Xiaomi built cars under its own banner, Huawei Technologies chose a different path into the EV sector. Huawei famously declared it would “not build cars” itself (partly to avoid competing directly with its customers and also due to Chinese regulations discouraging tech firms from starting car manufacturing from scratch). Instead, Huawei focused on being an enabler and partner – providing its technology to automakers to create smarter, more desirable EVs. Think of it as the “Intel Inside” model, but for cars – except in this case it’s “Huawei Inside”.
Huawei’s entry into autos can be traced to its establishment of an “Intelligent Automotive Solution” business unit around 2019, at the height of U.S. sanctions crippling its smartphone business. The company pivoted to find new revenue streams, and autos were attractive. By 2021, Huawei had partnered with a Chinese automaker, Seres (Chongqing Sokon Industry Group), to co-create a new EV brand called Aito. Huawei contributed the ICT (information and communication technology): a cutting-edge cockpit running Huawei’s HarmonyOS software, a suite of driver-assistance sensors and algorithms, and its powerful marketing channels. Seres contributed what Huawei didn’t have: car manufacturing experience and credentials (factories, an auto supply chain, regulatory licenses).
The Huawei-Seres partnership turned out to be a masterstroke for both. They launched the Aito M5, a mid-size SUV, in late 2021 (extended-range EV) and a pure EV version later, followed by a larger Aito M7 SUV in 2022. These vehicles were branded as “Aito powered by Huawei”, and Huawei even sells them in its own flagship stores across China – a unique distribution method where you can buy a Huawei phone and a Huawei-partnered car in one shop.
The results have been impressive:
Assembly line at Seres’ automotive factory in Chongqing, China, where Aito electric SUVs are built. Huawei’s partnership with Seres allows it to embed its technology into EVs without owning the entire manufacturing process.
Explosive Sales Growth: Aito quickly gained traction as a premium smart EV brand. In 2024, Aito delivered 387,100 vehicles to customers in China, up a staggering 268% from 2023. To put that in perspective, Aito (which didn’t exist three years prior) was outselling many established car brands. Monthly sales of the Aito M7 in late 2024 were exceeding 15,000 units, even rivaling Tesla’s Model Y in China in some months. Cumulative deliveries since brand launch crossed the half-million mark by early 2025. Huawei’s partner Seres, once a little-known EV maker, saw its overall vehicle sales nearly quadruple from 2023 to 2024 on the back of the Aito success. This trajectory indicates Huawei’s formula – make the car desirable via superior tech – was working with Chinese consumers.
Technology as a Differentiator: Huawei injected its tech DNA into these cars. The Aito vehicles boasted Huawei’s autonomous driving system, intelligent cockpit with voice assistant and multiple screens, and tight integration with Huawei’s ecosystem (phones, wearables). Buyers perceived Aito cars almost like “Huawei cars,” associating them with cutting-edge features. For example, the Aito M5 was often compared to the Tesla Model Y but with a more luxurious interior and Huawei’s HarmonyOS smart interface. As a telecom and ICT company, Huawei also brought expertise in connectivity (5G in cars, C-V2X communication, etc.) that gave Aito an edge in the coming world of connected vehicles.
Fast Time-to-Market through Partnership: By partnering, Huawei dramatically shortened the time needed to become a player in autos. Seres handled the homologation, safety testing, and production engineering – areas that would have been new and difficult for Huawei. Meanwhile, Huawei focused on what it knows best: electronics and software. Together they could develop and launch models relatively quickly. The Aito M5 went from concept to deliveries in roughly a year. Huawei’s consumer business experience also meant they pushed for an agile product development cycle, offering over-the-air updates and iterative improvements much like a smartphone. In essence, Huawei treated cars more like consumer gadgets, which resonated with tech-savvy buyers.
Retail and Brand Leverage: Huawei leveraged its extensive retail network (nationwide showrooms and authorized experience stores) to showcase Aito cars. This was unprecedented – suddenly a consumer shopping for a smartphone in a mall could stumble upon a shiny electric SUV in the Huawei store and take a test drive. The convenience and cool factor of this cannot be overstated. It gave Aito huge exposure at low cost. Additionally, Huawei’s brand in China, which stands for quality and national pride (especially after the U.S. sanctions saga), rubbed off on the Aito vehicles. Many Chinese consumers saw buying an Aito as akin to supporting a Huawei product – a plus for sales.
Manufacturing & Supply Chain Scaling via Seres: Seres, backed by Huawei’s cash infusion and technology, invested in expanding its manufacturing. The **gross profit margins of Seres’ EV business jumped to 23.8% in 2024 (from just 7.2% in 2023)**, as scale efficiencies kicked in. The factories ramped up to meet demand, with Huawei assisting in optimizing production using its expertise in automation and data (Huawei’s cloud and AI are used to streamline manufacturing processes). Because Seres was an existing automaker (though a small one), it already had supplier relationships, which Huawei could augment by perhaps negotiating better deals (Huawei is skilled in supply chain management from electronics). Effectively, Huawei didn’t have to build a supply chain from scratch – it piggybacked on Seres and enhanced it.
Regulatory Alignment: Huawei’s approach also neatly sidestepped Chinese regulatory hurdles. The Chinese government had signaled that it did not want a flood of new manufacturers in an already crowded auto industry and preferred tech firms to collaborate with carmakers rather than start new auto companies. By “jointly producing” Aito vehicles with Seres, Huawei stayed within the spirit of those rules. In fact, in early 2023 Huawei went as far as selling the Aito brand trademarks to Seres for $350 million, to make it clear that Seres is the automaker of record and Huawei is the technology provider. This move likely aimed to appease regulators and ensure Huawei’s deep involvement wouldn’t be seen as violating any ban on non-automakers building cars. It’s a fine line, but Huawei managed to walk it, essentially creating a new EV brand without formally being an automaker.
By 2025, Huawei’s influence in China’s EV sector is substantial. Not only through Aito, but Huawei also supplies its “Huawei Inside” smart vehicle platform to other automakers. For example, Huawei partnered with BAIC on the Arcfox Alpha S HI (Huawei Inside edition) and with Changan Automobile and CATL in a venture called Avatr. There’s also a partnership with Chery to co-develop new models (the Luxeed brand). Each partnership varies in depth, but the common thread is Huawei provides critical software/hardware (from lidar sensors to operating systems) and sometimes co-design, while the partner builds the car.
Huawei’s success shows the power of strategic partnerships and timing. Coming at a time when Huawei’s core phone business was hurt by sanctions, the EV push gave the company a new avenue for growth that dovetailed with national priorities (China’s push for EV leadership). Huawei aligned itself with the government’s vision by empowering a domestic automaker (Seres) to rise, rather than trying to import or dominate. It’s a “win-win” that created a new competitive EV player almost out of thin air.
One can’t help but compare this with Apple’s situation. If Apple could have found a willing major automaker partner (as Huawei did), perhaps Project Titan might have had a different fate. But cultural differences and Apple’s desire for full control impeded that. Huawei, by contrast, was willing to take a secondary role on paper but primary role in practice, essentially co-branding the car. This flexibility allowed Huawei to time the market perfectly – entering just as EV adoption in China was exploding circa 2021–2022. By not insisting on building the entire car alone, Huawei avoided many pitfalls and costs.
EV Manufacturing: A Different Beast
Making phones and laptops is hard. Making cars is exponentially harder. Apple, which relies on contractors like Foxconn, lacked the deep manufacturing control needed for EVs. Battery safety, powertrain reliability, and compliance with global vehicle regulations require years of domain expertise.
Meanwhile, Xiaomi partnered with BAIC and Huawei formed alliances with established players. They didn’t need to build it all in-house. They just needed to embed their software and brand into already-capable hardware platforms.
The China Factor: A Hidden Dealbreaker
Behind the scenes, geopolitics played a silent but powerful role. Apple is heavily reliant on Chinese manufacturing. But with U.S.–China decoupling accelerating, building a China-centered EV became a strategic liability. The U.S. is pressuring Apple to reduce dependency on Chinese components, while China tightens control over critical raw materials like graphite and gallium—both essential to EVs.
Apple faced a dilemma: bet its next big hardware product on a geopolitically volatile region, or pivot to AI, where it can exert more control. The choice became increasingly clear.
U.S.-China Decoupling and Regulatory Pressures: A Tale of Two Environments
The diverging fortunes of Apple versus Xiaomi/Huawei cannot be fully understood without the geopolitical backdrop. The 2020s have seen increasing U.S.-China decoupling, especially in high-tech sectors, which directly impacts the EV industry and any cross-border ambitions. In short, the policy environment for Apple (a U.S. company heavily reliant on Chinese manufacturing) was turning hostile to a China-centric EV supply chain, while the environment in China was very supportive for domestic EV firms and less welcoming to foreign entrants. This dynamic played a significant role in Apple’s EV failure and Chinese companies’ success.
Several facets of decoupling and regulatory pressures are relevant:
Trade Barriers and Tariffs: In an effort to protect and foster their own EV industries, both the U.S. and EU moved to impose barriers on Chinese EV imports by 2024. The U.S. government announced steep tariffs of up to 100% on imported Chinese electric vehicles and 25% on EV parts and batteries. These punitive tariffs (effective late 2024) essentially price Chinese-made cars out of the U.S. market. The EU similarly launched an anti-subsidy investigation and was considering tariffs as high as 27.5–38% on Chinese EVs. For Apple, this trend meant that even if it built an Apple Car in China (the logical place given supply chains), bringing it to Western markets would face heavy taxes, eroding profitability. Conversely, building the car outside China (to avoid tariffs) would mean higher costs due to a weaker supply chain and still likely needing Chinese components subject to tariffs. This no-win situation was a red flag for Apple. Meanwhile, Chinese companies like Xiaomi and Huawei can thrive at home without worrying about tariffs, and they have vast domestic demand to satisfy first. (It’s worth noting that Chinese EV makers’ global expansion plans have to account for these barriers – e.g., Nio, BYD, etc., are setting up some overseas assembly to mitigate tariffs, but for now Xiaomi/Huawei are focused on China where they have free rein.)
Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) and Local Content Rules: The United States’ IRA, passed in 2022, introduced generous EV tax credits only for vehicles that meet stringent North American assembly and battery content requirements. Specifically, it disqualifies EVs with battery minerals or components from “foreign entities of concern” (a.k.a. China) from the $7,500 federal credit over the next few years. By 2024, batteries need a certain percentage of materials from the U.S. or allies to get half the credit, and that percentage ratchets up. This is explicitly designed to exclude Chinese batteries from U.S.-sold EVs. For Apple, the IRA presented a headache: to sell an Apple Car in the U.S. with full incentives, Apple would need to source batteries from outside China (perhaps from new U.S. plants by LG or Panasonic, etc.) and assemble in North America. That would severely complicate supply chain and raise costs, given Chinese batteries are currently the cheapest and most advanced in many aspects. In essence, U.S. policy was signaling: “if you make an EV with China, you can’t benefit from U.S. subsidies.” Apple no doubt took this into account, and it further tilted the scales against doing an EV (which would likely rely on Chinese tech). By contrast, Chinese companies operating in China face no such constraints – in fact, they benefit from Chinese subsidies and policies that prefer local suppliers.
Export Controls and Tech Restrictions: The U.S.-China tech war also includes export controls on semiconductors and other tech. While this mostly affects Huawei’s phone business and China’s chip sector, there is a tangential effect on autos: advanced chips (like AI processors for autonomous driving) might be harder to obtain or use freely across borders. Huawei itself is under strict U.S. sanctions that bar it from accessing cutting-edge chips from TSMC, etc. Huawei navigated this by using slightly older chips in cars (which don’t need 5nm processes yet) and focusing on software. Apple wouldn’t have faced sanctions, but it would be wary of any future restrictions on EV-related tech transfers. The broader point is that an atmosphere of distrust exists – U.S. companies have been pressured to diversify supply chains away from China (Apple has been moving some production to India/Vietnam for iPhones), and Chinese companies are being restricted or scrutinized in Western markets (witness the bans on Chinese telecom gear, or proposals to ban TikTok). In such an atmosphere, Apple launching a high-profile product that depends on China (an Apple Car would have, undoubtedly, had heavy Chinese manufacturing input) could attract political backlash or supply risk. It’s another strategic factor making the car project look less prudent in 2023–24 from Apple’s perspective.
Chinese Regulatory Environment: On the flip side, China has tightened rules to manage its EV industry’s growth. It has encouraged consolidation (too many EV startups at one point) and issued guidelines like “encourage ICT firms to partner with automakers, not become automakers.” Huawei’s careful dance to not appear as an automaker shows the regulatory nuance. For foreign companies like Apple, Chinese regulators historically require joint ventures with local firms to manufacture cars in China. Apple would likely have had to partner with a Chinese automaker (as Tesla was the only exception granted to operate independently, and even Tesla now faces growing competition and no special treatment beyond early market entry). Would a Chinese state authority have greenlighted an “Apple Car Factory” in China 100% owned by Apple? Unlikely in the current climate, especially given how that might be seen as a threat to domestic brands. More likely, Apple would have had to JV with, say, a SAIC or BAIC – but any such negotiation would involve sharing IP and profit, terms Apple isn’t fond of. This is speculative, but it hints that Apple faced a tough path to manufacturing in China, whereas not manufacturing in China would mean giving up the supply chain advantage.
Nationalism and Consumer Preferences: Under decoupling, consumers themselves can be swayed by nationalist sentiments. In China, there’s growing pride in homegrown tech and sometimes a backlash against foreign products (depending on political winds). A pricey Apple Car might have been a hard sell against “patriotic” choices like NIO or Xiaomi in the Chinese market, especially after 2022 when national narratives turned against Apple a bit (e.g., reports of Chinese government agencies discouraging iPhone use). Meanwhile, in the U.S., rising wariness of Chinese technology means an Apple Car loaded with Chinese-made components could become a PR issue. Apple might have found itself caught in a no-win public relations spot between two countries.
In summary, decoupling added enormous friction to Apple’s EV plans. It raised costs, risks, and hurdles for an Apple Car, while simultaneously fortifying Chinese EV players who enjoyed secure home supply chains and backing. The U.S. essentially told Apple “if you want to build a car, please build it in the U.S. with U.S. batteries,” which would be slow and expensive, and not Apple’s typical model (Apple relies on the Foxconns of the world – largely Chinese/Taiwanese operations – for efficient production). On the Chinese side, Apple as a foreign automaker would not get the red carpet that Tesla initially got; times have changed, and China now has plenty of domestic champions to support.
Xiaomi and Huawei, by being on the right side of the decoupling divide (domestic Chinese companies), had the tailwinds of policy rather than headwinds. They aligned their strategies with government goals: Xiaomi building a huge EV factory in Beijing (creating jobs, advancing tech domestically), Huawei uplifting a Chinese automaker. They also don’t (yet) depend on exporting these cars – China’s market is sufficient and is the world’s largest, so if they only win in China that’s already a huge prize. Apple, coming from the outside, would have to navigate protectionism both at home and abroad.
Technical Ambition vs Market Reality
Apple’s vision of a fully autonomous EV was always several steps ahead of current technological readiness. Level 5 autonomy is still largely theoretical. Meanwhile, Tesla, BYD, and others dominate the actual market with Level 2 or Level 3 systems.
By the time Apple considered entering the EV market with a more modest offering, the cost-benefit equation had shifted. Why settle for low-margin, high-risk products when it already dominates in high-margin, ecosystem-driven tech?
Costs, Margins, and Corporate DNA
Apple’s business model is built around high-margin, tightly controlled experiences. Cars—especially electric ones—don’t fit this model. Margins are razor-thin. Warranty liabilities are enormous. Physical recalls cost billions. Apple’s excellence in phones and services simply didn’t translate to heavy manufacturing.
Verdict: A Calculated Retreat
Apple’s withdrawal from the EV race wasn’t a stumble—it was strategic triage. Far from being a sign of failure or lack of ambition, the decision reflected Apple’s core strengths: long-term vision, brand protection, and unflinching commitment to excellence. The company didn’t back out because it couldn’t build a car—but because the car no longer aligned with its future.
- Exploding costs with shrinking profit margins made the EV business a financial sinkhole, misaligned with Apple’s premium, high-margin model.
- Shifting technical targets—from Level 5 autonomy dreams to Level 2 compromises—undermined the foundational “wow” factor Apple needed to justify entering the crowded market.
- Geopolitical fragmentation between the U.S. and China destabilized the very supply chains Apple needed to scale EV production securely and affordably.
- Generative AI and ecosystem intelligence presented a more scalable, brand-consistent, and technically achievable frontier for innovation.
By contrast, Xiaomi and Huawei didn’t aim to reinvent mobility—they aimed to enhance it. They capitalized on what they already had: deep manufacturing roots in China, access to government incentives, agile engineering teams, and bold partnerships with legacy automakers. Where Apple pursued perfection, they pursued production. And in this race, speed and scale mattered more than sparkle.
In the 2024 EV landscape, dreams were still currency—but pragmatism paid the bills. Apple didn’t lose the EV war. It chose not to fight a battle that didn’t belong in its playbook. That’s not retreat. That’s mastery of focus.
Misreading the Competitive Landscape
One of the more understated reasons for Apple’s failure in the EV market was its miscalculation of the competitive terrain. When Project Titan was first conceptualized, legacy automakers were still figuring out how to electrify. By 2024, however, the field was crowded with aggressive incumbents and disruptors alike—Tesla, BYD, NIO, XPeng, Lucid, Rivian, and traditional players like Volkswagen, Hyundai, and GM all had real EVs on the road.
Apple would not have had a first-mover advantage. It would have entered as a latecomer, with minimal experience, no production capacity, and high expectations. In tech, Apple thrives as a category definer. In EVs, it would have been a follower.
Elon Musk’s Salute: A Symptom, Not a Cause
When Apple officially exited the EV race, Elon Musk responded with a cryptic emoji post—a salute and a cigarette—on X (formerly Twitter). The media buzzed, but the reality was more symbolic than causal. Musk’s gesture wasn’t a push factor for Apple’s decision; it was gloating, pure and simple. Project Titan’s demise was already a strategic inevitability rooted in business fundamentals, not social media taunts.
No Shareholder Interference
Despite conspiracy theories suggesting that Apple shareholders with Tesla holdings influenced the retreat, no credible reports support that idea. Bloomberg, Reuters, and Wired all affirm that the reasons were technical, strategic, and financial. Apple makes decisions at the C-suite level, not because of overlapping stock portfolios. The “Tesla sabotage” narrative is simply unfounded.
Why Chinese Companies Could Push Through
So why could Xiaomi and Huawei pull off what Apple couldn’t?
- Faster Iteration Cycles: Chinese firms operate in a hyper-competitive environment that rewards speed over perfection. Apple’s perfectionism became a bottleneck.
- Domestic Market Advantage: China’s EV market is the largest in the world, with 6 million units sold in 2023. Local players have access to a massive testbed.
- Regulatory Favor: Local governments offer land, subsidies, and accelerated permits to EV projects aligned with national goals.
- More Flexible Brand Identity: Xiaomi and Huawei aren’t boxed in by a premium-only image. They can scale from mid-range to high-end, giving them wider reach.
Could Apple Try Again?
It’s possible—but unlikely. Re-entering the EV market would mean overcoming all the same hurdles again, in an even more crowded space. Apple is now placing its bets on AI, Vision Pro, and perhaps future health-tech ventures. Vehicles require too much capital, carry too much risk, and return too little margin for Apple’s current appetite.
Also, the brand damage from a second public retreat would be catastrophic. Apple values its mystique. It rarely fails in public—and it doesn’t like repeating failures.
What This Says About Apple’s DNA
Apple’s identity is built around three pillars:
- Vertical Integration: It controls hardware, software, and services end-to-end.
- Brand Cohesion: Everything must be seamless, elegant, and premium.
- Margin Discipline: If a product can’t deliver 30–40% margins, it doesn’t make the cut.
EVs clash with all three. Supply chains are fragmented. The driving experience can’t be fully controlled without building the car yourself. And even Tesla struggles to maintain healthy margins. For Apple, entering the EV market was always an awkward fit—like asking a ballet dancer to run a marathon in steel boots.
The Silent Giant: Apple’s AI Gambit
By reassigning Project Titan staff to AI, Apple doubled down on a domain more aligned with its ethos. Generative AI can transform Siri, enable better photo editing, enhance predictive health apps, and power the next generation of wearables. All of this integrates with Apple’s existing ecosystem and bolsters its walled garden.
And AI, unlike EVs, can be monetized at scale via subscriptions, App Store services, or exclusive features for high-end devices. Apple isn’t just avoiding EVs—it’s leaning into the future it can control.
The Legacy of Project Titan
Though canceled, Project Titan leaves behind a valuable legacy:
- It forced Apple to explore autonomy, robotics, and sensors in depth.
- It accelerated internal R&D on LiDAR, advanced chips, and machine learning.
- It brought in automotive talent that may now fuel innovation in other verticals.
Think of Titan not as a failure, but as an expensive experiment that clarified what Apple should—and shouldn’t—pursue.
Not All Giants Walk the Same Path
In the end, Apple’s EV exit was a story of strategic alignment, or rather, misalignment. Cars demand long-term commitment, supply chain dominance, geopolitical risk management, and brutal cost competition. These aren’t areas where Apple excels—or wants to.
Xiaomi and Huawei approached EVs like digital appliances. Apple approached it like a moonshot. The lesson? Sometimes, restraint is the smartest innovation of all.
Project Titan was ambitious, inspiring, and ultimately doomed. But in its failure, it reminds us that success isn’t about chasing every trend—it’s about knowing which mountains you’re built to climb.
Could Apple’s EV Aspirations Be Revived?
Although the chapter of Project Titan appears closed, speculation continues about whether Apple might someday re-enter the automotive space—but in a different role. Could Apple instead provide software platforms for EVs? Could it license a version of “CarOS” to automakers, much like Android Auto or QNX? Might it produce high-end EV infotainment systems, augmented-reality dashboards, or proprietary chips for autonomous driving modules?
These alternatives wouldn’t require Apple to build or brand an entire car. They would let Apple do what it does best: insert itself at the intersection of software, hardware, and premium experience—without touching the heavy metal of car manufacturing.
Still, no such pivot is confirmed. Apple has shown no public signs of turning Titan into a platform strategy. For now, it appears to be focusing squarely on generative AI, health devices, and spatial computing through Vision Pro.
How This Affects Apple’s Global Positioning
Apple’s retreat from the EV space will have strategic implications for its brand positioning globally. In the United States, where consumer trust in Apple is high and iPhone loyalty is almost tribal, the move likely won’t make a dent. But in China—the world’s largest EV and smartphone market—the story is different.
Here, Apple faces surging competition from Huawei, Xiaomi, and Honor, not only in smartphones but now across digital ecosystems that span phones, homes, and cars. Huawei’s HarmonyOS integrates seamlessly across all device categories, including automobiles. That gives them a sticky ecosystem to rival Apple’s, especially in a nationalistic market increasingly favoring domestic champions.
With no vehicle in the mix, Apple risks ceding experiential territory to companies offering a unified digital lifestyle that includes mobility. This isn’t just about losing car sales—it’s about losing screen time, voice assistant usage, map interactions, and consumer data.
Lessons for Silicon Valley
Apple’s retreat offers sobering lessons to other tech giants considering bold hardware pivots:
- Not all problems are tech problems: The car industry operates on logistics, regulation, and scale—tech can’t solve those alone.
- Brand doesn’t override reality: Even the world’s most admired brand can’t sidestep structural challenges in a new domain.
- Timing matters: Entering a maturing market late, especially with untested tech, is rarely wise.
- Partnerships are power: Chinese firms succeeded not by reinventing the car, but by embedding themselves in existing structures. Apple’s reluctance to compromise may have been its downfall.
A Tale of Two Ecosystems
Xiaomi and Huawei succeeded by treating the car as just another node in a broader IoT ecosystem. For them, EVs are a natural extension of the smartphone experience—another screen, another interface, another data source. Apple, on the other hand, viewed the EV as a self-contained product that had to be “insanely great” on its own terms. That philosophical difference shaped everything—from timelines to resource allocation to corporate patience.
In a world where software-defined vehicles are increasingly dominant, Apple’s traditional model of perfection and control might have been a poor match for the rapid, iterative, and collaborative pace required in automotive innovation.
What the Future Holds for Apple’s Ambitions
Apple’s future now rests on different pillars. Spatial computing through Vision Pro. On-device AI that runs faster and more securely on custom silicon. Health sensors that predict disease. Seamless interactivity between Apple Watch, iPhone, and Mac. And perhaps someday, a deeper push into financial services, or even robotics.
But cars? Not anytime soon.
Vision Requires Discipline
In the end, Apple’s decision to cancel its EV program isn’t a story of failure—it’s a story of strategic discipline. Knowing when to stop matters as much as knowing when to start. Apple chose to retreat not out of fear or defeat, but because the equation no longer added up. The margins weren’t there. The partners weren’t ready. The geopolitical winds had shifted. And the opportunity cost was rising.
Meanwhile, Xiaomi and Huawei pressed forward—not by out-innovating Apple, but by out-executing it within their context. They took the field, found local allies, and made the right bets at the right time. Their EVs may not be perfect, but they’re real—and that’s what counts.
In business, ambition fuels vision. But survival favors adaptation. Apple adapted. And in doing so, it may have sacrificed one frontier to conquer others more aligned with its DNA. That, too, is a kind of victory.
The Cultural Code: What Apple Learns from China
Apple’s journey with Project Titan didn’t just highlight business risks—it spotlighted a profound cultural mismatch between Apple’s identity and the speed, adaptability, and pragmatism dominating the Chinese tech ecosystem. While Apple meticulously crafts polished, closed systems, Chinese competitors thrive on rapid iteration and ecosystem openness.
This contrast came into sharper focus during Titan’s pursuit of Chinese manufacturing partners. Companies like BYD, Geely, and NIO operate with nationalistic urgency and resource flexibility. They are used to managing opaque supply chains, state incentives, and high-speed pivots. Apple’s insistence on control and privacy likely complicated negotiations. And when geopolitical tensions increased, the cracks widened further.
In the long run, Apple may take inspiration from how these companies navigate chaos with calculated compromise—without sacrificing vision. But the cultural divide remains a formidable one. Apple can’t become Chinese, nor should it. Instead, it must learn how to collaborate more flexibly while still protecting the integrity of its ecosystem.
A New Frontier: AI as the Next “iPhone Moment”
By reallocating hundreds of engineers from the EV project to AI development, Apple signals a new moonshot. Instead of building a car, Apple now aims to redefine user-device interaction through large language models, generative vision, predictive health, and real-time intelligence.
This strategic pivot parallels Apple’s greatest successes: it doesn’t just chase trends—it refines them until they’re irresistible. Just as the iPhone reimagined the phone, Apple now seeks to reimagine what intelligent assistance means in the age of machine learning.
And unlike EVs, where scale demands sprawling factories, AI scales through cloud and silicon—domains where Apple already excels. From the A-series chips to the M-series in Macs, Apple’s control of the silicon stack means its devices are uniquely positioned to run cutting-edge AI workloads with privacy and performance intact.
Comparative Summary: Apple vs. Xiaomi/Huawei in EVs
| Factor | Apple | Xiaomi / Huawei |
|---|---|---|
| Business Model | Premium product margins, low volume | Mid to high-range volume, flexible pricing |
| Manufacturing Strategy | Relies on third-party contractors | Joint ventures with local OEMs (e.g., BAIC) |
| Supply Chain Risk | High, due to US-China tensions | Low, with government alignment |
| Innovation Culture | Controlled, perfectionist, secretive | Iterative, fast, adaptable |
| Autonomy Goal | Level 5 initially, then Level 2 | Pragmatic Level 2-3 with real-world feedback |
| Market Entry Timing | Late and uncertain | Aligned with national rollout support |
Choosing the Right Battles
Apple’s foray into the EV market was never guaranteed to succeed—not because of incompetence, but because it required Apple to abandon too many of its core strengths. The world of vehicles is full of regulation, heavy engineering, fluctuating commodity prices, and government influence. That’s far from the streamlined, minimalist, high-margin terrain Apple prefers to dominate.
What Apple has done instead is an act of strategic humility: it stepped back from a tempting but misaligned pursuit, redirected resources to a more promising frontier, and reaffirmed its identity as a maker of magical, seamless, intelligent devices that live in the palm of your hand or wrap around your wrist.
Xiaomi and Huawei deserve credit for their boldness, their agility, and their execution. They won the EV race—not by dreaming bigger than Apple, but by choosing battles better suited to their ecosystem strengths.
Legacy of a Phantom Car
Project Titan never delivered a car—but it delivered insights. It taught Apple about ambition, about limits, and about the hard realities of industrial transformation. It forced one of the world’s most influential companies to confront its weaknesses and to evolve its priorities.
In hindsight, Titan wasn’t a waste. It was a prototype—not just of a vehicle, but of strategic direction. And in abandoning it, Apple reaffirmed something far more powerful than its ability to build a car:
Its ability to walk away.
Reflections for Investors and Technologists
For investors, the death of Project Titan may initially seem like a missed opportunity—but it reflects one of Apple’s most enduring traits: long-term discipline over short-term excitement. The company rarely chases hype. Instead, it plays for durability, waiting for the technological stars to align before launching new categories.
Project Titan was an expensive bet, reportedly consuming billions in R&D and a decade of attention. But this wasn’t sunk cost—it was strategic reconnaissance. Apple tested boundaries, explored future markets, and made sure it understood the risks before betting the company’s brand and capital on a segment as volatile as EVs.
For technologists, Titan offers a reminder that not every good idea is a good business. The tech world celebrates innovation, but sustainability requires more than vision—it demands supply chains, partners, policy alignment, and go-to-market finesse. Apple learned that the hard way. And in learning it, they may have saved themselves from a far costlier misstep.
The Role of Timing in Disruption
One could argue that Apple’s timing simply wasn’t right. Had they started earlier—perhaps in the mid-2010s, when Tesla was still struggling and the EV field was less crowded—they might have carved a meaningful niche. But by the late 2010s and early 2020s, the competitive landscape had shifted dramatically.
Legacy automakers like Ford, GM, Volkswagen, and Toyota had already committed billions to electrification. Chinese brands were scaling rapidly. And Tesla had established not just dominance in electric drivetrains, but a loyal brand following Apple would’ve struggled to displace. Entering the EV market then would have required either monumental innovation or aggressive pricing—neither of which fit Apple’s historical playbook.
And so, Apple chose not to disrupt, but to divert.
Apple’s Core Principle: Control the Ecosystem
More than any specific hardware category, what defines Apple is its pursuit of ecosystem control. The iPhone, Apple Watch, AirPods, iPad, Mac, and Vision Pro aren’t just products—they’re interoperable touchpoints in a closed-loop experience. Apple controls the silicon, the OS, the store, and the cloud. That integration is why its devices “just work.”
An EV—especially one built in someone else’s factory, with someone else’s chassis, battery, and local regulators—threatens that control. Apple would need to compromise, delegate, or co-own the user experience. And in Apple’s culture, compromise is rarely a welcome strategy.
So, when Project Titan could no longer guarantee Apple-grade control, it became philosophically incompatible with Apple’s DNA.
Innovation Isn’t Always Addition
Sometimes, the most innovative thing a company can do is not add something new—but subtract something misaligned. Apple’s cancellation of its EV was not a sign of failure, but a declaration of focus. While rivals play the volume game in the crowded highways of the EV market, Apple is carving quieter, smarter roads—ones that lead through health, AI, and spatial computing.
And in the grand arc of history, the tech giants who survive aren’t the ones who try to do everything. They’re the ones who know exactly what not to do.
End of the Road, or a Fork?
Project Titan may be dead—but Apple’s ambition is alive. It now points not toward the highway, but toward the cloud, the chip, the cortex, and the wrist. In retreating from the EV battlefield, Apple may have simply taken a different route—a smarter one, paved not with wheels, but with wisdom.
The vehicle Apple didn’t build may someday be remembered not as a failure—but as the most important thing Apple never shipped.
Looking Ahead: What Comes After Titan?
Now that Project Titan has been officially shelved, Apple’s horizon looks more aligned with cognitive systems than mechanical engineering. Internally, Apple is rumored to be concentrating its AI efforts under a unified strategy that spans iOS, watchOS, visionOS, and macOS. This includes on-device LLMs, real-time audio generation, and context-aware automation that anticipates user intent without violating privacy.
In short, Apple’s next big “device” may not be hardware at all—it may be a personal intelligence layer embedded invisibly across all its platforms. That, more than a car, could define the next decade of Apple innovation.
Meanwhile, its Chinese competitors will continue to push boundaries in EVs. Huawei’s HarmonyOS-powered dashboard systems are reshaping in-vehicle UX, while Xiaomi’s HyperOS integrates EVs, phones, and smart homes under one interface. Each brand is leaning into its strengths—and Apple, wisely, has returned to its own.
What We Can Learn from the Titan Autopsy
- Not all big companies can do everything. Even Apple has its limits—and knowing them is strategic wisdom, not weakness.
- Supply chain sovereignty matters more than ever. In a world shaped by sanctions, tariffs, and restricted minerals, your factory map is as strategic as your product roadmap.
- Culture is a moat. Apple’s perfectionism, secrecy, and obsession with control make it great at some things—but terrible at others, like navigating the fast, messy world of auto manufacturing.
- Geopolitics shapes strategy. U.S.-China decoupling isn’t theoretical—it actively alters what kinds of products global firms can safely build at scale.
- Success often means saying no. Titan didn’t fail because Apple tried and lost. It succeeded because Apple knew when to stop trying.
A Post-Titan World
The story of Apple’s EV retreat is more than a corporate footnote—it’s a parable for our technological times. It shows that even the most admired, cash-rich, and capable company in the world must bow to the realities of manufacturing physics, policy shifts, competitive saturation, and cultural fit.
And yet, it also shows that strategic retreats are often the first step toward transformational advances. By folding Titan and freeing up resources, Apple isn’t becoming less ambitious—it’s becoming more focused. In the silence of an unbuilt engine, the hum of a smarter future is already beginning to sound.
Whether that future will ride on wheels, flow through silicon, or hover in visionOS remains to be seen. But one thing is clear: Apple knows where it’s going. And it no longer needs a car to get there.
What Project Titan Reveals About the EV Industry
Apple’s exit from the electric vehicle space isn’t just a tale about one company’s internal decisions. It serves as a powerful mirror reflecting the state of the EV industry itself. What was once a gold rush fueled by government incentives, environmental urgency, and technological optimism has now matured into a high-barrier, low-margin, geopolitically sensitive arena dominated by scale, supply chain mastery, and regional resilience.
Consider the shift: In the early 2010s, EV startups had novelty and subsidies on their side. Today, governments are winding down subsidies, battery raw materials are geopolitically weaponized, and market share is increasingly about affordability and local production. Tesla, BYD, Geely, and Hyundai-Kia have embedded themselves into this new normal. For a newcomer—especially one that builds nothing on its own and insists on control at every level—the challenge is nearly insurmountable.
Even successful entrants like Xiaomi and Huawei have benefited from deep local integration and strategic alliances. Xiaomi partnered with BAIC for manufacturing support, while Huawei has embedded itself as a tier-1 supplier of smart vehicle components, infotainment systems, and operating systems. Neither sought to reinvent the car. They sought to complement it—and the market rewarded them for that pragmatism.
The Strategic Elegance of Quitting
Apple’s decision to cancel Project Titan wasn’t simply retreat—it was an elegant pivot. In a corporate environment that often rewards overcommitment and punishes course correction, Apple’s ability to walk away from a decade-long, billion-dollar investment signals a level of executive clarity that many competitors lack. Rather than chase sunk costs, Apple chose to reinvest in areas more aligned with its values, capabilities, and future market dynamics.
This rare act of restraint underlines a principle increasingly valuable in a volatile global economy: strategic agility. In environments defined by disruption, the winners aren’t just those who innovate, but those who adapt faster, learn deeper, and detach sooner from unviable trajectories.
Apple’s Identity Remains Intact
In the end, what makes Apple Apple is not its willingness to try everything—but its discernment in choosing what not to pursue. The car was always a strange fit, a foreign beast with foreign rules. Apple’s exit isn’t a step back; it’s a return to coherence. It reminds us that greatness is built not just by bold moves—but by thoughtful restraint.
The future of transportation will be shaped by many: engineers, policy makers, climate scientists, and software developers. Apple will surely contribute to that future—but on its own terms. Perhaps through AI-powered mobility tools. Perhaps through intelligent wearables that interface with autonomous environments. Perhaps through chips that live at the intersection of sensing and understanding. But not, at least for now, through a car with an Apple logo on its hood.
In a world obsessed with disruption, Apple chose alignment. And in doing so, it may have just disrupted the myth that every tech giant must build a car to shape the future.
The Road Not Taken, the Path Reimagined
So ends the story of Project Titan—not in smoke and failure, but in clarity and recalibration. Apple’s journey into the EV world taught us that vision isn’t always about pressing forward. Sometimes, it’s about stepping back, reassessing, and redirecting your energy toward paths more resonant with who you truly are.
For Apple, the vehicle was never the end goal. It was a question—a test of scale, ambition, and technological reach. The answer, ultimately, was found in silence. In not building. In not launching. In not driving.
And in that silence, Apple heard the signal of something far louder—its true future calling, already waiting on the other side of Titan.