The latest labor-market data paint a troubling picture: well over one million Americans with bachelor’s degrees remain jobless, a count that is growing and stands near all‑time highs. BLS surveys show that as of late 2024 roughly 1.5 million workers aged 25+ with a BA or higher were unemployed – and by mid‑2025 that number approached nearly 1.9 million. This surge far exceeds the historical norm. For example, on the eve of the pandemic (2019) the number of unemployed college-educated workers was closer to 1.2 million. In percentage terms, college-degree holders now account for about a quarter of all unemployed workers – the highest share on record. In other words, roughly one in four people without jobs today has a college degree, up from about one in five a few years ago. These shifts suggest that the long‑standing payoff from higher education is eroding.
The data show that unemployment rates among degree-holders have climbed across most cohorts. For instance, recent BLS reports indicate that by late 2025 the jobless rate for very young graduates (ages 20–24) was approaching 10%, versus under 4% for those in their late twenties. Even prime‑age college graduates face rising difficulty: the unemployment rate for all BA holders 25–34 has edged above 3%, against only about 2% in early 2020. These elevated rates translate into the multi‑million absolute counts. By contrast, a decade ago the college-educated typically enjoyed far lower joblessness – in late 2019 the unemployment rate for workers with at least a BA was only about 2.0%. Today it has climbed back toward 2.5–3% (annual average), meaning many more individuals without jobs at any given time.
The combination of these trends – rising unemployment counts and shares among degree holders – is unprecedented in the modern data. Surveys since the 1990s never saw college graduates make up such a large fraction of the unemployed, nor unemployment rates for graduates at these levels outside major recessions. The only comparable periods were the depths of the Great Recession and the 2020 pandemic collapse, when overall joblessness spiked for all education levels. But those were severe cyclical shocks from which graduate unemployment swiftly recovered. The current surge, by contrast, comes amid a modest slowdown and has persisted longer than normal, suggesting deeper structural shifts in the labor market for educated workers.
How the Data Are Collected
Understanding these figures requires a look at how the government measures unemployment. The principal source is the Current Population Survey (CPS) run by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Each month, the CPS surveys about 60,000 U.S. households, asking detailed questions about employment status, education, and demographic characteristics. Anyone without a job who is actively searching for work (or waiting to start a job) is counted as “unemployed.” The CPS tallies unemployment by education level: respondents report their highest degree or diploma, allowing the BLS to tabulate unemployment rates and counts for groups like “bachelor’s degree and higher.” These official estimates are the basis for the often‑quoted statistics.
The CPS data have strengths and limitations. On the one hand, the survey is timely and nationally representative, so its headline unemployment numbers (overall and by education) are widely regarded as reliable indicators of current labor-market conditions. On the other hand, the survey’s sample size and methodology introduce some margin of error, especially when looking at subgroups. For example, small subpopulations (such as African-American or Asian college graduates) may have volatile monthly figures. BLS publishes seasonally adjusted series (removing predictable seasonal swings) and also provides national and state breakdowns. Separate data collections, like the American Community Survey (ACS) from the Census Bureau or administrative unemployment insurance counts, can offer additional perspective but typically lag and cover different definitions.
It’s important to note what “unemployed college graduates” means in this context: it includes anyone age 25 or older who has at least a bachelor’s degree (or higher) and is not working but actively seeking work. It does not count graduates who have dropped out of the labor force (not looking for work). Nor does it capture underemployment (working part-time by choice) or those in jobs below their qualification level. Still, the CPS figures are the standard barometer. When we say “over one million jobless college graduates,” we mean the CPS count of people with a BA or advanced degree who are officially unemployed. By BLS’s tallies, that has exceeded 1.4 million in 2024 and climbed toward 1.9 million by late 2025.
Cyclical Versus Structural Trends
A critical question is whether this graduate unemployment is cyclical – caused by temporary economic downturn – or structural – reflecting deeper mismatches. By definition, cyclical unemployment rises when growth slows and falls during expansions. Structural unemployment persists even in good times, arising from shifts in how and where jobs are created relative to workers’ skills.
Historical data help untangle the causes. The jobless rate for college graduates did spike briefly during the 2008–09 recession and the COVID crisis, but then fell back sharply as the economy recovered. In contrast, the recent increase has happened even without a steep recession. From 2022 through 2024 the U.S. saw moderate growth and low overall unemployment (around 3.5% total), yet graduate joblessness climbed. This suggests structural factors: the underlying rate of hiring for degree holders may be weakening.
Labor economists break unemployment into flows (entries and exits). In recent research, Federal Reserve analysts found that college graduates’ job-finding rate (the rate at which unemployed grads land jobs) has declined steadily since the 2000s, long before the pandemic. In effect, it is taking longer on average for a graduate to find the next job. Some of this is cyclical – exits from unemployment do fall in slowdowns – but much of the trend is persistent. Today’s young grads appear to “turn over” jobs more slowly and enter unemployment more quickly than in past decades, narrowing the advantage that higher education used to confer in the labor market.
Another way to see this is the share of long-term unemployment. In September 2025, about 1.8 million Americans had been jobless for 27 weeks or more (long-term unemployed) – roughly 24% of all unemployed, according to BLS. That share is about average historically, but the raw count of long-term jobless college grads has grown. When durable match problems surface (skilled workers staying unemployed long), economists call that structural. By contrast, if graduate unemployment were purely cyclical, we’d expect it to vanish quickly once growth resumed. So far, however, the rebound in hiring has favored more junior or differently skilled workers: college-degree unemployment has been stubborn.
In sum, the pattern is mixed. Part of the current rise is cyclical – for example, technology and finance firms have done layoffs in 2023–24. But analysts worry structural shifts are at play. These include the fact that growth in the “college economy” – industries that traditionally hire many grads – has slowed. When companies become more cost-conscious or automate certain tasks, even white-collar jobs can disappear. The net effect is higher baseline unemployment for college-educated workers, even in the absence of a deep recession.
Who Is Affected: Demographics and Degree Fields
The burden of unemployment is not evenly shared among college graduates. Recent data show stark differences by age, race/ethnicity, and field of study.
- Age/Cohort. Younger graduates have borne the brunt of joblessness. For example, BLS reported that by September 2025 nearly 10% of recent BA holders age 20–24 were unemployed – roughly triple the rate among older graduates. In contrast, college graduates in their late 20s and early 30s saw unemployment around 3–4% at that time. The very latest entrants into the labor market face the toughest competition. Many are recent graduates who may lack experience or specific skills, so they find it harder to quickly secure a role. This age gradient suggests that the recent spike is concentrated among entrants, not just seasoned workers.
- Race and Ethnicity. Unemployment rates for degree holders vary significantly by race. In fall 2025, about 2–3% of White and Asian college graduates were jobless, but rates were much higher for minority groups. Notably, the African-American BA population saw unemployment jump to nearly 5%. Similarly, Hispanic college graduates had a rate in the mid‑3% range. These disparities likely reflect a combination of factors: differences in fields of study, networking and discrimination patterns, as well as concentration in industries that are lagging. The consequence is that historically advantaged groups (White, Asian) still enjoy relatively lower joblessness than others, even as all groups have seen rates creep up. In short, the data indicate that the recent rise in college-degree unemployment has worsened racial inequities in the labor market.
- Field of Study (Majors). Not all degrees are created equal in today’s market. Surveys of recent graduates reveal wide variation in under- and unemployment by major. At one extreme, majors in nursing, engineering, or computer science generally yield abundant job offers; underemployment rates in these fields can be as low as 10–17%. At the other extreme, graduates in fields like criminal justice, performing arts, or general studies are far more likely to end up in jobs that do not require a college degree – often a majority of those cohorts. For instance, roughly half of criminal justice or liberal arts graduates were found in “non-degree” jobs one year out of college. These differences show up in unemployment as well: when demand for jobs like security, social assistance or hospitality softens, graduates of related majors can be disproportionately affected. Conversely, STEM and health-care fields have so far held up better. The aggregate BLS data cannot break out by major, but studies consistently find that graduates in oversupplied or non-technical fields face longer job searches.
- Geography. Regional labor market conditions also matter. Some states and metro areas with strong tech, finance, or healthcare sectors (e.g. coastal cities) continue to have high demand for skilled labor, while others (especially smaller cities or rural regions) have seen fewer new opportunities for graduates. Exact data on unemployment by state and degree level are not published every month, but wage and employment surveys suggest that the “college gradient” of joblessness is steeper in lagging economies. For example, manufacturing-oriented states that have lost jobs may not provide as many openings for arts, communications, or social-science graduates. In contrast, booming technology hubs might see shortfalls of qualified applicants. These uneven geographic trends can contribute to what researchers call “regional dislocation” – an oversupply of educated workers in some areas and undersupply in others.
Underemployment: More than Just Being Jobless
Focusing on the official unemployment count tells only part of the story. Equally important is underemployment – people who are working but not to their full capacity. For college graduates, this often means being stuck in part‑time or low-skilled jobs. Government surveys capture some aspects: the CPS measures the number of people working part-time for economic reasons (they want full-time work but can’t find it). However, that measure lumps college and non-college workers together.
Separate analyses of recent graduates suggest underemployment is alarmingly high. For example, a Federal Reserve study of young college graduates (ages 22–27) found that over 40% were “underemployed” in 2025. This means they were either jobless, or working in occupations where a majority of workers lack a bachelor’s degree. Put differently, almost half of new grads were not using their degrees in the labor market. Such estimates have held near 40–45% since the pandemic, far above the rates seen before 2010. Involuntary part-time work is another indicator: among college-educated workers overall, the share working part-time for economic reasons has ticked up slightly.
These figures imply that many college-educated workers are employed but not fully utilizing their skills. For policy and social outcomes, underemployment can be nearly as damaging as unemployment: it lowers incomes, delays career progression, and can lead to “skill atrophy.” The data also show that once underemployment occurs early in a career, it tends to persist. Surveys track cohorts of graduates and find that those who start in non-graduate jobs often remain out of their field even years later. Thus, the data underscore that for young graduates today, getting any job is increasingly easy – but getting a good job that matches one’s training remains a serious challenge.
Structural Factors Driving Graduate Unemployment
Why has joblessness among college graduates risen so sharply? Economists point to multiple structural forces acting together:
- Shifts in Industry Demand. The types of industries and occupations expanding or contracting in recent years do not always match the output of colleges. For example, growth in healthcare and hospitality has created many jobs, but many of those roles don’t require a four-year degree. Meanwhile, certain traditionally college-intensive fields like finance and high-end technology have seen layoffs or slowed hiring. Corporate automation and the rise of artificial intelligence have also reduced entry-level openings in sectors such as software development and research; some companies report replacing routine analyst positions with algorithms. In sectors like manufacturing, globalization and offshoring have long reduced opportunities for both college and non-college workers, but technical fields (industrial engineering, applied sciences) can be indirectly affected. The net effect is that employment growth has become more “education-neutral,” as one research report noted, meaning that having a degree no longer guarantees faster job growth.
- Education–Job Mismatch. There is mounting evidence that the volume and specialization of college education do not align perfectly with labor market needs. On the one hand, college enrollment soared in recent decades, producing more graduates than ever before. This makes competition stiffer for the college-level jobs that do exist. On the other hand, many graduates emerge with skill sets that employers currently value less. Surveys and analyses repeatedly find that employers often cite lack of relevant experience or mismatched skills among new grads. For example, reports indicate an oversupply of graduates in fields like communications, social sciences, or undeclared “general studies,” which do not map neatly to specific job roles. Without targeted retraining or internships, these graduates struggle more.
- Demographic and Social Shifts. The U.S. workforce is aging and diversifying, which also plays into these trends. Many mid-career workers are also acquiring degrees (returning to school, online education, etc.), adding to the total supply of credentialed workers. That means 40-somethings with newly earned degrees compete against 20-somethings, possibly diluting the “graduate premium.” At the same time, student debt burdens and rising college costs influence job choices: some degree-holders may accept less-relevant work simply to service loans or start a salary. Meanwhile, changes in immigration policy and demographics have reduced the influx of foreign-educated workers in some sectors, slightly altering demand dynamics (though this has primarily affected graduate-level roles).
- Regional Economic Disparities. Growth in high-wage, knowledge-intensive jobs has been geographically uneven. Tech and research jobs have been concentrated in a handful of metropolitan areas; in contrast, many other parts of the country have seen relatively slower growth or even decline in professional services. For example, the decline of industries like oil and gas, or the slow recovery in parts of the Midwest, means fewer local jobs for engineers, geologists, or business grads who stay in those regions. Conversely, some “hot” markets (like the Bay Area or Boston) still have plenty of college-level openings, sometimes even facing shortages. The mismatch between where graduates live and where jobs are limits mobility; not everyone can relocate easily.
- Education and Economic Policy. Policymakers have also influenced the landscape indirectly. For instance, the post‑2008 expansion of federal student aid increased college enrollments without a matching emphasis on outcomes. Federal funding of research and development – which can create high-skilled jobs – has been relatively flat, reducing spillover growth. Tax and regulatory policies that affect business investment and hiring can also skew demand: when employers perceive higher costs or uncertainty, they may slow hiring of new graduates. Additionally, generous unemployment benefits during the pandemic and early 2020s (extensions of UI benefits) may have changed job-search incentives, although economists generally find these had only small effects on unemployment. Importantly, higher education policy itself has only recently begun grappling with labor market alignment, so the pace of retraining and curriculum adjustment remains slower than the pace of industrial change.
Each of these factors contributes to the current scenario where having a degree no longer guarantees easy entry into the workforce. They are structural because they reflect deeper shifts in how the economy creates jobs and values skills.
Government Interpretation and Response
Federal and state governments have taken note of the troubling data on graduate unemployment. Labor officials and economists interpret this crisis through different lenses:
- Federal Agencies. The Bureau of Labor Statistics (which produces the data) has mostly reported the raw trends without judgment, leaving interpretation to policymakers and analysts. However, researchers at the Federal Reserve and Department of Labor have acknowledged the reversal of some long-standing advantages of college education. For example, Federal Reserve Bank economists have published commentaries showing the narrowing gap between high school and college unemployment rates. Some Fed regional presidents have publicly warned that rising graduate unemployment could signal weakening “college premium” and called for caution in workforce planning.
- Administration and Advisers. The White House Council of Economic Advisers (CEA) has highlighted the problem of degree underemployment in broader discussions of higher education reform. There have been proposals (both during and after the Obama Administration, and in recent Democratic budgets) to increase funding for career and technical education, expand apprenticeship programs, and incentivize colleges to focus on graduation outcomes. The Biden Administration’s infrastructure and jobs proposals included grants for community colleges and workforce training aimed in part at reducing skills mismatches. On student aid, there has been debate: some argue that widespread debt relief or increased grant aid (Pell) could encourage more schooling, whereas critics worry such measures ignore whether degrees translate to jobs.
- Congress and States. Congress has been somewhat divided. Some legislators from industries with skills shortages (engineering, healthcare, cybersecurity) have pushed for expanding STEM education pipelines. Others have expressed concern that federal subsidies for college encourage over-enrollment in fields with poor job prospects. Bipartisan bills have been introduced to require colleges to report graduate outcomes (employment and earnings data), reflecting a demand for transparency. At the state level, several governors have launched workforce task forces or reoriented community college programs toward local industry needs. For example, states with large rural areas have initiated public-private partnerships to retrain displaced workers for health tech and advanced manufacturing. However, no sweeping national policy has yet emerged; much of the response has been piecemeal.
- Labor Market Programs. Unemployment insurance and job-search assistance remain available to unemployed graduates, but many in this group do not qualify for UI if they left school rather than a job. Federal workforce programs (like CareerOneStop centers) offer counseling and skills matching for dislocated workers, including some with degrees. The U.S. Department of Education and Department of Labor have occasionally launched data initiatives, such as the College Scorecard and Skills Training Programs, to better align education with labor demand. These are long-term initiatives rather than immediate fixes.
In sum, policymakers recognize the issue but are struggling to respond. Some emphasize reskilling and flexible curricula, while others highlight the need for broad economic growth to create more jobs for graduates. The current labor-market climate has thus elevated the conversation about how colleges and employers can bridge the gap between diplomas and job requirements.
Implications for Policy and the Future
The headline numbers – over one million unemployed college graduates – underscore a complex challenge at the intersection of education and economic policy. For decades, a college degree was nearly a surefire ticket to prosperity. The data now warn that this assumption needs reevaluation. Aggregate statistics show that while college graduates still generally earn more and have lower unemployment than non-graduates, the gap has narrowed. Younger and minority graduates in particular face a rougher transition from school to work than their predecessors. Underemployment remains pervasive, indicating that simply increasing degree counts is not enough.
What do these trends mean going forward? First, education policy must be data-driven. The stark rise in graduate unemployment suggests that colleges should pay closer attention to labor market signals – for instance, counseling students toward high-demand fields without abandoning creativity and critical thinking skills. More robust career services and better tracking of alumni outcomes could guide students and institutions alike.
Second, labor policy should adapt to the new reality. Workforce training and lifelong learning programs will likely become more important for degree holders as well as non-graduates. The government may need to support continuous upskilling (for example, in digital literacy or technical certifications) even for those with college backgrounds. In higher education funding, there may be more emphasis on aligning grants and loans with expected job outcomes, or incentivizing degrees in STEM and other high-demand fields while ensuring broad access.
Finally, economic policy that boosts overall job growth – including for knowledge workers – remains crucial. Even a structurally shifting economy will need new job creation. Policies that stimulate innovation, investment in growing industries (like clean energy, biotech, advanced manufacturing), and support for small businesses could help absorb some of the educated workforce. At the same time, the social safety net and unemployment programs may need recalibration to account for this changing profile of unemployment.
The record number of college-educated unemployed in America is a warning sign. It does not negate the value of higher education, but it calls for a smarter approach to workforce development. By combining comprehensive data analysis with thoughtful policy adjustments – from retooling education to expanding training opportunities – the country can work to ensure that a college degree remains a reliable path to opportunity. Absent such efforts, the risk is that many Americans invest time and money in degrees only to find themselves without matching jobs, undermining both individual aspirations and the nation’s human capital.