Technological sovereignty – the ability of a nation to independently develop and control critical technologies – has become a strategic priority in the 2020s. In a world where the United States has long dominated areas like operating systems, semiconductor chips, cloud platforms, and app ecosystems, countries such as India and China are increasingly determined to build parallel tech ecosystems on their own terms. Both Asian giants are pursuing technology independence to reduce vulnerabilities, especially after recent geopolitical shocks like trade wars and sanctions. This article explores how India and China are each striving for self-reliance in domains like artificial intelligence (AI), smartphones, operating systems, app stores, and cloud infrastructure – without reliance on U.S. tech – and what this race for technological sovereignty means for the future. It takes a journalistic yet analytical look at the post-2020 efforts of the two countries to create robust, sanction-proof digital ecosystems.
At stake is not just pride or economic opportunity, but national security and resilience. The risks of over-dependence on foreign technology were starkly illustrated by events such as the U.S. banning China’s telecom champion Huawei from accessing American chips and software in 2019, and global semiconductor shortages during the pandemic. Policymakers in Beijing and New Delhi alike recognize that a sudden U.S. cutoff could paralyze critical systems, from payments to government services. Thus, China and India are racing to “de-Americanize” their tech sectors, albeit in different ways and to varying extents. China has been building an insulated tech universe for years (accelerating after 2020), while India has more recently begun ramping up indigenous alternatives as a hedge against dependency. Both see technological self-reliance as essential to thriving in an era of tariffs, sanctions, and techno-nationalism.
In the sections that follow, we examine each country’s strategy to foster homegrown ecosystems in AI, mobile hardware and software (smartphones, operating systems, app stores), cloud computing, and other digital infrastructure. We compare their progress, highlight key initiatives (from China’s HarmonyOS to India’s BharOS, from Alibaba Cloud to India’s sovereign cloud plans), and discuss the broader implications. In a world increasingly divided by digital iron curtains, India and China are crafting their own playbooks to ensure they are not at the mercy of U.S. tech giants or geopolitical whims. The competition between them to achieve tech sovereignty – and perhaps offer their models to other nations – will shape the global technology landscape in the coming decade.
The New Imperative: Technological Sovereignty in a Post-2020 World
The year 2020 was a turning point for global technology relations. The COVID-19 pandemic disrupted supply chains and underscored the downsides of overreliance on any single source. Meanwhile, the U.S.-China trade war escalated into a tech war, with Washington imposing export controls on semiconductors and cutting Chinese firms off from critical U.S. technology. In parallel, India faced a border clash with China in 2020 that led New Delhi to ban dozens of Chinese mobile apps virtually overnight, awakening Indian policymakers to their own digital dependencies. These events injected urgency into “self-reliance” missions in both countries.
For China, achieving self-sufficiency in key tech sectors became a matter of survival under U.S. sanctions. President Xi Jinping explicitly called for a nationwide push to build an “independent and controllable” tech ecosystem across hardware and software, emphasizing AI sovereignty and indigenous innovation. Beijing’s message was clear: to be “sanction-proof,” China must reduce its reliance on American chips, software frameworks, and intellectual property. This sentiment dovetailed with policies already underway (such as the Made in China 2025 initiative and the concept of “dual circulation” focusing on domestic tech development). Post-2020, China redoubled efforts on everything from homegrown semiconductor fabs to proprietary operating systems, aiming to plug any gaps that U.S. export controls could exploit.
India’s wake-up call was of a different nature. While not directly sanctioned or cut off, India realized that its over-dependence on foreign (especially U.S.) technology platforms posed strategic vulnerabilities. An Indian think tank report in 2025 warned that the country’s economy and security were “deeply reliant on US software, cloud, and social media platforms,” and that in a geopolitical crisis “a U.S.-ordered cutoff could instantly paralyze digital payments, tax filings, and government services nationwide.”. This stark assessment, along with hypothetical scenarios like steep U.S. tariffs on India, has galvanized calls in New Delhi for a “Digital Swaraj” mission by 2030 to achieve tech independence. India’s leadership, while maintaining generally friendly ties with Washington, recognizes that true sovereignty means having domestic options for critical tech – from operating systems to clouds – so that no external actor can “switch off” India’s digital backbone.
Thus, both countries share a common goal of reducing reliance on U.S. tech, but their motivations blend security, economic and even ideological factors. For China, it is about outpacing a geopolitical rival and insuring against chokeholds in the supply chain. For India, it is about protecting its booming digital economy and data sovereignty from being leveraged by a powerful ally (or any other nation) in adverse times. As we’ll see next, China’s approach has been more heavy-handed and state-driven – yielding faster progress in some areas – whereas India’s approach is emerging through policy nudges, partnerships, and indigenous innovation with a mix of public and private efforts.
China’s Parallel Tech Ecosystem: The Great Decoupling
China has spent the last decade deliberately building a parallel tech universe, often sealed off from or running in tandem to the U.S.-centric global tech ecosystem. This spans everything from internet services (China’s own search, social media, e-commerce platforms) to hardware (Chinese smartphones and network gear) and increasingly the foundational layers like semiconductors and operating systems. The end goal is clear: a Chinese user or enterprise could fulfill all their tech needs – device, software, connectivity, cloud, AI – using Chinese-made or Chinese-controlled technology, minimizing any points of dependency on American companies or standards. Below, we explore key pillars of China’s technological sovereignty drive in recent years.
Homegrown AI and Semiconductor Independence
In the arena of artificial intelligence and chips, China has treated self-reliance as a national strategic priority. Facing U.S. export controls that cut off access to cutting-edge AI processors (like Nvidia GPUs) and chip manufacturing tools, Beijing has rallied its tech industry to develop indigenous capabilities at every layer of the AI tech stack. This means not just training AI models, but also producing the semiconductor “brains” to power those models and creating the fundamental software frameworks – all without U.S. inputs, if necessary.
Significant strides have been made. Chinese firms have designed their own AI chips – for example, Huawei’s Ascend series of AI accelerators and Alibaba’s NPU chips – as alternatives to Nvidia. While analysts note these domestic chips still “do not yet match” the absolute top-tier U.S. chips in performance, China’s capability is improving fast. Huawei, collaborating with China’s leading chip foundry SMIC, recently surprised observers by producing a 7-nanometer Kirin 9000s processor to power its latest smartphone, despite U.S. sanctions on advanced EUV lithography equipment. This feat was hailed by a Huawei executive as proof that China has “virtually overcome crippling U.S. tech restrictions” through independent innovation. Indeed, Huawei claims to have “built an ecosystem entirely independent of the United States” in computing infrastructure, AI, and other software – a bold statement underscoring China’s confidence in its sanction resilience.
Beijing’s heaviest state support has focused on the semiconductor sector, which requires enormous capital and know-how. Generous subsidies and national projects have spurred a wave of Chinese chip startups (designing CPUs, GPUs, AI accelerators), new fabs for memory and logic chips, and initiatives like RISC-V open architecture adoption to replace Western IP cores. The results are mixed: China now produces a large share of the world’s simpler chips and has some advanced nodes in limited volume (7nm), but it still lags in the cutting-edge <5nm realm and in semiconductor equipment. Nonetheless, Beijing’s indigenous innovation drive has closed some gap and more importantly, created a non-U.S. supply chain for many components. By nurturing a domestic talent pool, massive funding, and a protected home market hungry for AI, China’s AI ecosystem is increasingly able to source critical inputs domestically – from algorithms to chips – albeit with a few chokepoints remaining in high-end tools.
China’s pursuit of AI sovereignty also extends to software and data. Recognizing that AI leadership depends on access to big data and computing power, China has leveraged its huge population and relatively lax data rules to feed local AI models. Chinese tech giants (Baidu, Alibaba, Tencent, Huawei) have been encouraged to develop their own AI frameworks (such as Baidu’s PaddlePaddle, an alternative to Google’s TensorFlow) and large language models. By 2023, a flurry of Chinese LLMs like Baidu’s ERNIE and others were competing domestically with OpenAI’s ChatGPT (which is effectively blocked in China). The government’s support for open-source movement has been pragmatic – Chinese researchers actively use and contribute to global open-source AI projects, but there is also a move to host repositories and code libraries within China to avoid potential cutoffs from platforms like GitHub in a conflict. Xi Jinping’s call in 2025 for “self-strengthening” in AI explicitly included building the entire AI technology stack at home – models, frameworks, and the chips to run them. The motivation is clear: China wants to be invulnerable to any U.S. attempt to throttle its AI rise, and indeed aims to surpass the U.S. in AI applications by leveraging the scale of its domestic market.
Smartphones, 5G, and Operating Systems: Decoupling from Android and Windows
Perhaps the most visible aspect of China’s tech sovereignty project is its creation of domestic smartphone and telecom ecosystems parallel to the Western ones. Over the past decade, Chinese companies like Huawei, Xiaomi, Oppo, and Vivo became global smartphone leaders. But they still depended on Google’s Android operating system and U.S.-designed chips (Qualcomm processors, etc.) – a vulnerability that became evident when the U.S. barred Google from providing Android services to Huawei in 2019. That moment was an inflection point: suddenly, a Chinese smartphone giant was cut off from Google Mobile Services, threatening its global business. Huawei responded by accelerating development of its own HarmonyOS – an in-house operating system – and an entire suite of alternatives to Google’s apps (Huawei Mobile Services and AppGallery app store). Today, Huawei’s HarmonyOS is on hundreds of millions of devices (particularly inside China) and stands as a concrete example of a Chinese-built OS that doesn’t rely on any American company’s approval. It is also being extended from phones to IoT and even PCs.
Beyond Huawei, China generally had a unique mobile ecosystem due to the Great Firewall. Google’s app store (Play Store) and many U.S. apps have long been banned in China, which forced Chinese manufacturers and developers to create their own app distribution channels and services. As a result, Android in China is a forked, de-Googled version on which numerous domestic app stores (run by Tencent, Baidu, Xiaomi, etc.) thrive. Chinese users download apps from these local stores, use homegrown social media (WeChat instead of WhatsApp, Weibo instead of Twitter), and pay via Alipay/WeChat Pay rather than Visa or PayPal. In effect, China built an entire mobile Internet universe parallel to Silicon Valley’s – one that could continue functioning even if U.S. companies pull out completely. This ecosystem has only strengthened post-2020. By cutting off Huawei, the U.S. inadvertently spurred Chinese firms to double down on Android forks and non-U.S. app ecosystems, a playbook now being emulated by others (as we will see with India’s attempts). Today, a Chinese consumer can buy a phone made in China, running a China-developed OS, using only Chinese apps and cloud services – achieving a measure of tech independence that would have been unthinkable a decade ago.
The operating system layer is crucial for sovereignty, and China has mounted a multi-front campaign to replace foreign OSes in key use cases, especially government and enterprise. For general consumers, Android (sans Google) and HarmonyOS cover mobile. But for PCs and servers, Microsoft Windows has been a longstanding dependency. In the mid-2010s, China began developing Linux-based domestic OSes such as Kylin for government use. This effort kicked into high gear around 2019 when reports emerged that Beijing instructed all government offices and critical infrastructure to remove foreign hardware and software by 2022. Nicknamed the “3-5-2” policy (phasing out 30% in 2020, 50% in 2021, 20% in 2022), this directive aimed to eliminate Windows, Microsoft Office, and foreign-made PCs from government systems. The motivation was both security (concerns over foreign backdoors) and leverage (preparing for a scenario where U.S. vendors might be forbidden to provide updates/support). By mandating Chinese alternatives – e.g. replacing a Dell PC with a Lenovo (Chinese brand) and Windows OS with NeoKylin Linux – authorities sought to reduce China’s reliance on foreign tech by hundreds of millions of units.
As of 2023–2025, these plans are coming to fruition. The Chinese government has banned Windows and Intel/AMD chips in new government computers, requiring instead domestic Linux-based OS (like Kylin, NeoKylin, or UOS (Unity Operating System) by UnionTech) and Chinese-made processors. In October 2025, a historic shift saw China’s Ministry of Commerce officially stop using Microsoft Office formats and adopt WPS Office (by Chinese firm Kingsoft) as the standard for government documents. This move away from Microsoft’s Word/Excel file formats – with government files now in WPS format – symbolizes a break from Western software standards in favor of domestic solutions. It was the result of years of phased transition: starting with trials around 2020, clear mandates by 2022 for state enterprises to drop foreign office suites by 2027, and culminating in 2025 with formal adoption of WPS format for all official docs. The implications are profound: sensitive government workflows will now run entirely on Chinese-controlled software, improving security and ensuring that even something as routine as document editing is no longer subject to U.S. company licensing.
China’s “de-Windowsification” includes several homegrown OS options gaining ground: Kylin/NeoKylin (with roots in China’s defense tech university) reportedly hold 90% of the government OS market, and UOS (a Debian Linux fork) is widely deployed in agencies and state firms. New initiatives like OpenKylin (an open-source community-driven OS launched in 2022) aim to provide a user-friendly alternative that mimics Windows for ease of transition. Even Huawei has introduced a PC version of HarmonyOS (for certain business/government clients) as of 2025. The Chinese strategy is clear: through a mix of administrative mandates, procurement policies favoring domestic software, and heavy investment in local OS development, Beijing is systematically squeezing out U.S. operating systems and software from all government and critical systems. This not only protects against a scenario where Microsoft or others might cut off support under U.S. orders, but also helps Chinese software firms grow and eventually compete globally.
Parallel efforts in telecom infrastructure further illustrate China’s approach. Companies like Huawei and ZTE built China’s own 5G network equipment industry, reducing reliance on Western firms (to the point that by 2020, China didn’t need Nokia or Ericsson gear domestically, and conversely many countries banned Huawei 5G on security grounds). China’s development of Beidou satellite navigation is another facet of tech sovereignty – an alternative to the U.S. GPS system to ensure Chinese military and commercial applications aren’t dependent on an American satellite system. While not the focus of this article, it’s worth noting that technological independence for China spans everything from navigation systems to online services. For any critical tech provided by the West, China has tried to either create its local equivalent or heavily localize a fork.
Cloud and Software Services: Local Giants in a Protected Market
In the realm of cloud computing and online platforms, China has fostered an ecosystem where domestic players dominate, thanks in part to market protection and regulations that favor local control of data. While globally Amazon Web Services, Microsoft Azure, and Google Cloud rule the cloud industry, in China those firms have little or no direct foothold. Instead, Alibaba Cloud (Aliyun), Tencent Cloud, Huawei Cloud, and Baidu’s cloud services are the leaders providing IaaS and SaaS solutions within China. By policy, foreign cloud operators must partner with Chinese companies to operate in China’s market (for example, Microsoft Azure is offered via a local partner 21Vianet in a limited capacity). This has ensured that Chinese government and businesses overwhelmingly host data on Chinese-run servers. As a result, if the U.S. ever tried to sanction cloud services, China would be relatively insulated because its critical data is on sovereign cloud infrastructure under Beijing’s jurisdiction.
The Chinese government has also enforced data localization and cybersecurity laws that essentially mandate data generated in China stays in China. This legal firewall complements the technical Great Firewall. Together, they mean China’s internet and cloud are a walled garden: not easily subject to external disruption, but also not easily integrated with the global cloud. Chinese cloud providers, particularly Alibaba, have matured rapidly and some now compete regionally in Asia with decent success. Domestically, they provide everything from cloud storage, enterprise software (Alibaba’s DingTalk vs. Slack, Tencent’s WeCom, etc.), to AI cloud services. Huawei’s cloud unit, for instance, despite being banned from certain Western markets, is aggressively expanding in emerging markets and offers its own AI chips in cloud servers, pitching itself as a non-U.S. alternative for cloud and AI infrastructure. A senior Huawei executive in 2025 highlighted how Huawei’s cloud and AI computing platform – powered by its Ascend processors – demonstrates an ecosystem independent of U.S. technology. Indeed, Huawei unveiled a CloudCluster with 384 Ascend AI processors delivering 300 petaflops, entirely built with Chinese chips, showcasing that even high-performance cloud computing need not rely on Intel or Nvidia.
The software-as-a-service domain within China similarly features local substitutes for most popular Western services. For productivity, as noted, WPS Office has replaced Microsoft Office in many settings. For databases and enterprise software, companies like Alibaba and Huawei provide domestic database management systems, while China’s own tech stack (like the Huawei EulerOS for servers) is being adopted in sectors like finance and transportation. Social media and content are entirely in-house: WeChat, QQ, Weibo, Toutiao, Douyin (TikTok’s Chinese version) etc., ensure that Chinese users are not dependent on Facebook, Twitter, or YouTube (which are banned). This means not only user data stays in China, but also Beijing can assert control – an added motivation beyond pure independence. Technological sovereignty in China is intertwined with cybersovereignty (government control of content and data). The side effect of these policies is that Chinese companies had a massive home market shielded from U.S. competition, allowing them to innovate and expand abroad from a position of strength. For example, TikTok’s global rise can be partly attributed to the strong base its parent ByteDance built in a protected home market before venturing out.
To sum up China’s strategy: by 2025, China has largely built a parallel tech ecosystem that mirrors the U.S.-led one, from hardware to software. It has its own semiconductor industry (albeit still catching up at the cutting edge), its own mobile and PC operating systems, its own app stores and internet platforms, its own cloud providers and AI models, and even its own standards (like BeiDou for navigation, potentially its own tech standards in 5G/6G). The degree of independence varies by sector – e.g., in quantum computing or cutting-edge chips China still needs international collaboration – but the direction is firmly set. Chinese leaders believe that controlling the “full stack” is necessary to become a true tech superpower and to survive any U.S. sanctions or decoupling moves. As one report concluded, in the future “sovereignty will be measured not just by territory or GDP but by who controls the code.” By that measure, China has made itself far less beholden to American code and silicon.
However, building an autarkic tech ecosystem comes with costs: duplication of efforts, potential incompatibility with global systems, and huge expenditures. It’s a path only a few nations can attempt. China, with its market scale and authoritarian policy tools, has proven it can get surprisingly far, essentially creating a Chinese tech world parallel to the U.S. tech world. Where does this leave India? Interestingly, India – despite a very different political system and relationship with the U.S. – is also charting a course towards more tech autonomy, albeit in a more selective and collaborative manner.
India’s Quest for Tech Self-Reliance: Digital Swaraj and Aatmanirbharta
India’s approach to technological sovereignty has gained momentum since 2020 under slogans like “Aatmanirbhar Bharat” (self-reliant India) and “Digital India.” Unlike China, India is a democracy with a largely open market, and it has not outright blocked Western tech giants from its market (in fact, Indians are some of the biggest users of Google, Facebook, and Amazon services). However, a combination of geopolitical shifts and domestic priorities is driving India to develop parallel indigenous capabilities, so that it is not overly dependent on or vulnerable to any one foreign country’s tech dominance – whether that be China’s or America’s. In this section, we discuss how India is nurturing its own ecosystems in software, hardware, and digital infrastructure, aiming for the ability to stand on its own feet if required.
Reducing Reliance on Foreign Software and Platforms
One of India’s primary concerns is the heavy reliance on U.S. software, operating systems, and social platforms for both civilian and government use. Practically all Indian smartphones run Google’s Android or Apple’s iOS; most PCs run Windows; Indian firms use cloud services from AWS/Azure; and social media like WhatsApp, YouTube, Twitter (now X) are ubiquitous in public discourse. This dominance of foreign (mostly American) tech is seen as a “strategic vulnerability”, as highlighted by the Global Trade Research Initiative (GTRI) report in 2025. The report warned that Indian “phones, computers, defence and government applications run on US systems,” and any serious diplomatic conflict could result in a crippling cutoff. For instance, if Google were forced by U.S. law to disable Android updates or Google Play services in India, or if Microsoft locked India out of Windows and Azure, the impact would be immense. This realization has spurred calls for India to develop its own sovereign digital solutions – from operating systems to cloud platforms.
In response, the Indian government and tech community have taken steps to encourage indigenous software alternatives and open-source adoption. One high-profile initiative is the development of BharOS – an Indian mobile operating system. In early 2023, a team from IIT Madras unveiled BharOS, pitched as “India’s answer to Google’s Android and Apple’s iOS.” Government ministers publicly tested BharOS, signaling official support for the concept of a homegrown OS. BharOS is essentially a fork of Android’s open-source code (AOSP) but with all Google services removed. The idea is to offer a smartphone OS that gives users more control, privacy, and freedom from Big Tech’s ecosystem. Because it’s based on Android, BharOS can still run most Android apps (side-loaded or via an alternative app store), but it doesn’t come pre-loaded with Google’s apps or the Google Play Store. This “de-Googled” approach is similar to what Amazon did with its Fire OS and what Huawei did with HarmonyOS – except here it’s driven by Indian academic and startup efforts, with the government’s blessing.
While BharOS faces an uphill battle to attain mass adoption (given the enormous network effects of Android/iOS), its very development is significant. It shows India “taking a page out of China’s playbook in developing its own local tech ecosystem.” The aim is not necessarily to immediately displace Android, but to catalyze an environment where forked Android variants and third-party app stores can thrive, thereby loosening Google’s monopoly. Notably, India’s competition regulator in late 2022 ordered Google to allow forked versions of Android and to ease restrictions on phone makers. In compliance, Google announced it would permit other app stores and not force pre-installation of Google apps on all Android devices in India. This opens the door for options like BharOS or Indus OS (another Indian Android-based OS focused on regional languages) to be loaded on devices, or for OEMs to ship phones without Google if they choose. It also means an Indian app store could be integrated without friction.
Indeed, the Indian government has been exploring an alternative app store to reduce dependence on Google’s Play Store and Apple’s App Store. There were reports of a state-supported “GOV.IN AppStore” and discussions with Apple/Google to allow such stores on devices. In 2025, officials even pushed Apple and Google to pre-install certain Indian government apps on every new phone, and to make India’s own app store available without “untrusted source” warnings. While Apple and Google have been resistant (much as they initially resisted similar requests in Russia until a law was passed), the very push reflects India’s desire to boost its indigenous apps and services by leveraging its huge market power. The government’s reasoning is that Indian-developed apps (for instance, a government e-governance app or a local social platform) should not be buried beneath foreign apps – pre-loading them could “greatly boost their usage” in the population. Such measures straddle the line between promotion and protectionism, but they align with the larger goal: ensure that India is not entirely at the mercy of Apple and Google’s gatekeeping for reaching its own citizens digitally.
Another area is social media and communication platforms. After the 2020 border tensions with China, India banned TikTok and hundreds of other Chinese apps, citing data security. This ban created a vacuum that some Indian apps tried to fill (e.g., Chingari, Josh, Moj for short videos in place of TikTok). While none have reached TikTok’s global scale, they do have millions of users domestically. Likewise, for Twitter, an Indian microblogging alternative called Koo emerged around 2021. Koo gained some government endorsement (with Indian ministers opening accounts) as part of a narrative of digital “Atmanirbharta.” It offered interface in multiple Indian languages to differentiate itself. Though Twitter (now X) remains dominant among English-speaking urban users, Koo’s attempt signaled an Indian appetite for homegrown social platforms not subject to Silicon Valley’s policies. The Indian government has also insisted on greater local compliance from global social media – for instance, new IT rules require firms like WhatsApp and Twitter to have local grievance officers and even trace message origins if demanded. At one point, the government developed an in-house messaging app for officials (“Sandes”) to reduce use of WhatsApp for official work. All these efforts tie into the idea of digital sovereignty: if needed, India should be capable of running its digital communications and social discourse on Indian-run platforms.
Crucially, Indian policymakers have started treating data as a strategic resource akin to oil. India’s huge population of internet users generates massive data that currently fuels the algorithms and ad revenues of mostly U.S. companies. The GTRI report pointed out that India’s “huge user base fuels US AI and ad revenues,” implying India is effectively enriching foreign AI firms with its data. To counter this, India is insisting on local data storage (data localization laws for sectors like payments and telecom), and even floated the idea of taxing digital transactions of foreign tech firms. By keeping data within its borders and under domestic rules, India believes it can turn its vast data into “bargaining power in trade, technology, and security negotiations.” In practice, this means pushing companies like Google, Amazon, Facebook to build local data centers and obey Indian law on data handling – which they have started doing to avoid being locked out of the market. It also means building Indian capabilities in data analytics and AI so that Indian companies can extract value from this resource, rather than ceding it entirely to foreign tech giants.
Indigenous Hardware and Manufacturing Ecosystem
While India is known more for software and IT services, it has increasingly focused on developing a domestic hardware manufacturing base as part of tech sovereignty. Recognizing that relying solely on imports (whether Chinese electronics or American chips) is risky, the government launched production-linked incentive (PLI) schemes to boost local manufacturing of smartphones, semiconductors, and electronics. This ties not only to reducing import bills but also to supply chain resilience – ensuring India can produce critical hardware on its own soil if global supply flows are disrupted.
Smartphone manufacturing is a notable success of these policies. A decade ago, almost all phones in India were imported; today, thanks to tax incentives and PLI subsidies, major players like Foxconn, Wistron, and Samsung have set up large assembly plants in India to make phones for Apple, Xiaomi, and others. India now produces smartphones in the tens of millions domestically, even exporting some. By inviting Apple’s suppliers to India, the government killed two birds with one stone: it reduced reliance on China for imports and positioned India as an alternative hub if companies seek to diversify away from China. In fact, Apple’s latest iPhones are being assembled in India almost concurrently with China, which would have been unthinkable a few years back. This gives India leverage – if U.S.-China tensions rise, Apple and others have India as a manufacturing base, potentially shielding India from any U.S. tech export fallout (since the production in India could continue for the Indian market). It also builds local skills and ancillary industries.
When it comes to semiconductors and chips, India is admittedly far behind China, but is now making earnest moves. One landmark development was the announcement in 2023 of a $2.7 billion semiconductor assembly and testing plant by U.S. chipmaker Micron in Gujarat. This facility (for packaging and testing chips) is not a full fab for manufacturing silicon wafers, but it’s a critical part of the chip supply chain and represents Micron’s first such investment in India. The government provided substantial incentives (around $1.3 billion) to secure this project. It happened in parallel with a U.S.-India initiative to deepen tech cooperation (the iCET – Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technologies – launched in 2023). The White House actively pressed U.S. chip firms to invest in India as part of a strategy to “de-risk” supply chains away from China. This geopolitical backing means India’s quest for chip capacity is getting support from American allies (somewhat ironic as India seeks independence from foreign tech, yet here foreign investments are enabling it – but the key difference is who the foreign partner is). The Micron plant, expected to be operational by 2025, will give India a foothold in the semiconductor domain, and more importantly know-how transfer.
India is also trying to establish semiconductor fabs for actual chip manufacturing, though progress has been slow. A joint venture by local conglomerate Vedanta and Foxconn aimed to build a chip fab, but faced setbacks when they couldn’t tie up with a proven tech partner and Foxconn withdrew in 2023. This indicates the challenges – semiconductor fabrication is highly complex and even huge subsidies might not suffice without the right expertise (which currently resides largely in the U.S., Taiwan, South Korea). Still, talks are ongoing with other companies, and the government has an “India Semiconductor Mission” offering $10 billion in incentives to attract chipmakers. The long-term vision is to have at least one or two cutting-edge fabs on Indian soil (perhaps 28nm to 40nm node to start, which would cover many strategic needs like automotive, IoT chips). Until that happens, India’s hardware sovereignty will remain limited by the need to import advanced chips (from Intel, TSMC, etc.). But by focusing on assembly, packaging, and design, India aims to integrate itself into the chip supply chain in a way that can’t be easily disentangled.
Another key effort is leveraging open-source technologies like RISC-V to leapfrog in chip design. In 2022, the government launched the Digital India RISC-V (DIR-V) program to encourage Indian-developed microprocessors using the open RISC-V architecture. RISC-V, being free of licensing, is attractive for countries seeking independence from proprietary architectures (like ARM or x86 which are Western-controlled). Under DIR-V, India set aggressive milestones – aiming for commercially viable indigenous processors (such as the SHAKTI and VEGA projects) by 2023. The program brings together startups, academia (IITs), and global companies in collaboration, and India even joined RISC-V International’s board to have a say in its evolution. By investing in RISC-V talent and designs, India hopes to produce certain chips (for mobile, IoT, automotive, etc.) that could be manufactured either in India (when fabs exist) or in friendly countries, thereby avoiding dependence on ARM or Intel’s IP. This is a long game – early prototypes like IIT Madras’s Shakti chip were made on older process nodes with help from Intel’s foundry. But the strategy underscores India’s desire for self-reliance in chip design, not just assembly.
We should also note India’s moves in telecom and networking gear. After witnessing how heavily countries rely on a few vendors for 5G (and how the U.S.-China rift forced choices), India has been cautious. It quietly kept Chinese vendors (Huawei, ZTE) out of its 5G rollout, even without an official ban – telecom operators in India are using Ericsson, Nokia, and local players for 5G. Additionally, India invested in developing a local 4G/5G stack. A state-run center (C-DoT) and companies like Tejas Networks worked on indigenous 4G/5G technology. By 2022, India announced it had an indigenous 5G testbed and even a new 5G standard for rural (5Gi) which was later merged into global standards. The larger point: India doesn’t want to be caught in a situation where it has no options but Chinese or Western gear for critical networks. By nurturing an ecosystem of domestic telecom equipment (even if not cutting-edge yet), India is aiming for the capability to maintain its networks independently if needed. The ability to survive sanctions extends to the communications backbone as well, so that internet and phone networks keep running even if foreign vendors withdraw support.
Digital Public Infrastructure: India’s Unique Path
A distinguishing feature of India’s tech sovereignty journey is its emphasis on digital public goods and infrastructure that are open and locally controlled. Instead of trying to clone every Silicon Valley company with a domestic version (which China successfully did), India’s strategy has been to create government-backed digital platforms that level the playing field for local players and reduce dependence on foreign private monopolies.
A prime example is UPI (Unified Payments Interface), launched in 2016. UPI is a real-time payment system developed by India’s National Payments Corporation (NPCI) – essentially a public utility for instant money transfers via mobile. In a few short years, UPI revolutionized payments in India, leading to billions of transactions monthly and eclipsing the use of foreign card networks like Visa/Mastercard for many uses. Apps built on UPI (many private Indian apps as well as Google’s Tez/Google Pay which adopted UPI) became ubiquitous for everything from street vendor payments to e-commerce. By creating UPI, India reduced reliance on cash (improving transparency) without ceding the payment rails to a foreign tech giant or card company. In fact, when Mastercard and Visa were later embroiled in regulatory issues about data storage, India didn’t worry as much, because UPI (and its linked RuPay card network) offered an alternative under Indian control. The GTRI report noted how “just as UPI…changed the world of payments,” India can build similarly transformative indigenous platforms for other domains.
Following UPI’s success, India pursued ONDC (Open Network for Digital Commerce) in 2022. ONDC is an open protocol for e-commerce that aims to break the dominance of Amazon and Walmart/Flipkart by enabling any seller to reach customers through a network of interoperable platforms. Essentially, it’s trying to do for online shopping what UPI did for payments – create a decentralized network where no single foreign company controls the market access. Early trials of ONDC have onboarded thousands of small retailers, and while it’s nascent, the project carries strategic weight: if India can avoid a scenario where one or two U.S. corporations control all e-commerce flows, it retains digital sovereignty in commerce and protects local businesses from being at the mercy of global platform policies.
Other components of India’s “digital stack” include Aadhaar (digital biometric ID) which is nationally run, and related APIs for authentication, digital signatures (e.g., Digilocker, e-Sign), as well as data empowerment frameworks (to give citizens control of their data via consent managers). All these are domestically developed and governed systems. They ensure that foundational digital identity and data exchange layers are not controlled by an outside entity. For instance, India did not rely on a foreign ID system (some countries use systems by Thales or others) but built its own Aadhaar enrolling over a billion people. This gives India autonomy in how identity data is used (with all the debates on privacy being internal matters, not dictated by a foreign tech policy).
The cumulative effect of these public digital goods is that India can run a modern digital economy largely on local rails: payments through UPI, e-commerce through ONDC, identity via Aadhaar, etc. Apps and private innovation then flourish on top of these rails (including foreign apps, which are welcome to plug in, but must abide by Indian-set rules of the game). It’s a different model from China’s state-driven tech protectionism or the West’s blend of market dominance and rising protectionist policies. It sits somewhere in between – an open but sovereign digital economy, where core infrastructure is national or open-source, and competitive forces (including foreign companies) can operate on top as long as they respect local regulations.
Toward a Secure and Self-Reliant Future
In recent years, India’s government has started formulating explicit strategies for tech sovereignty. The GTRI think-tank recommended a detailed roadmap called the “Digital Swaraj Mission” to make India self-reliant in critical tech by 2030. It suggests phased goals: in the short term (1–2 years), mandate sovereign cloud hosting for sensitive data, launch a national OS initiative, and pilot a switch to Linux in key ministries. Indeed, by 2024 some ministries were testing Linux and open source alternatives instead of Windows/Office. In the medium term (3–5 years), the plan is for all government systems to fully migrate to Indian-developed software and have robust public-private cybersecurity collaboration. And in the long term (5–7 years), India should achieve parity in cloud technology (so that Indian cloud services are as competent as foreign ones), replace all foreign OS in defense and critical sectors with domestic ones, and even create “globally competitive open-network platforms” that could serve as alternatives in the world market. While ambitious, this blueprint aligns with the trajectory we’ve discussed: it is a push to ensure India’s core digital backbone is indigenously controlled to the extent possible. The rallying cry is that if India does not act now, it risks “being digitally switched off in the future” by someone else’s whim.
It’s important to highlight that India’s approach to reducing U.S. reliance does not mean a confrontation with the U.S. (as is the case with China). In fact, India remains a strategic partner to the U.S. in many ways, and the U.S. is supportive of India’s rise as a tech hub to counterbalance China. However, India also values strategic autonomy – it doesn’t want to be in a position where it has to choose sides or suffer if relations sour. So India is carefully balancing: on one hand partnering with American firms and receiving investments (Micron, Google’s investment in Jio, etc.), and on the other hand, keeping an independent streak (e.g., developing BharOS, insisting on data localization, or buying oil from sanctioned Russia – showing it won’t simply toe a line if its own interests differ). This balancing act is sometimes termed “multi-alignment” or maintaining “strategic autonomy”. In the technology domain, it means diversifying sources and building indigenous capacity simultaneously.
A vivid hypothetical: if tomorrow the U.S. were to sanction India (improbable as it seems in the current geopolitics), would India’s digital life stop? Today it would severely disrupt things – Google, Microsoft, and Apple touches so much of Indian IT. But by 2030, if India’s plans materialize, the answer could be: it would hurt but not cripple. Payments could still flow on UPI (which doesn’t need Visa or Mastercard). Smartphones would still function (perhaps with BharOS or at least with AOSP and alternate app stores, should Google services vanish). Government work would continue on Indian cloud servers using open-source software. Perhaps even day-to-day communication could shift to an Indian messenger if WhatsApp stopped working. In essence, India aims to have a safety net of domestic tech options ready.
It is worth noting the challenges India faces on this path. Unlike China, India does not have an insulated internet – nor does it want to isolate itself. This means Indian alternatives must be good enough to compete with global offerings on merit. That’s a high bar; for instance, getting developers to build apps for BharOS or populate a new app store will be tough when the Google Play ecosystem is so entrenched. Moreover, India’s R&D spending is far lower than China’s; many Indian tech workers prefer private sector or MNC jobs to working on fundamental research. Bridging this gap will require sustained investment, incentives, and perhaps tapping into the large Indian diaspora expertise. Also, while the government can mandate things for public sector (like encouraging OSS in ministries), it cannot dictate consumer or market behavior to the extent China’s government can. Thus, India’s strategy relies more on incentivization and market dynamics rather than bans. For example, if India creates a terrific, low-cost “Bharat Cloud” service, Indian startups might voluntarily choose it over AWS, thus reducing foreign reliance by market choice. If it’s subpar, they won’t. So the onus is on Indian tech sector to rise to the challenge.
Comparing the Two Models: Contrasting Approaches to Tech Sovereignty
Both China and India have converged on the objective of technological sovereignty, but their approaches and progress differ dramatically due to their distinct political systems, economic models, and relationships with the West. Here, we compare their strategies and consider how this India vs China race for tech independence is unfolding.
State Control vs. Market Democracy: China’s governance allows it to centrally mandate technology changes (e.g. banning foreign software in government by decree, or blocking Western platforms outright to cultivate local ones). This top-down force can achieve rapid results – as seen in the comprehensive replacement of Windows and Office in government within a few years. India, as a democracy with a private-sector led tech economy, cannot impose bans on U.S. companies so sweepingly (and likely doesn’t desire to, given its geopolitical stance). Instead, India uses a mix of regulation, persuasion, and partnership. For instance, rather than ban Google outright, India fined it for anticompetitive practices and compelled it to allow competitors a chance. Rather than block Facebook, India drafted IT rules to make it more accountable locally. This means India’s progress is slower and more measured – it must bring along multiple stakeholders (industry, consumers, courts) when pushing for change.
Economic Scale and Tech Ecosystem Maturity: China’s tech ecosystem is far more mature and broad-based than India’s. Chinese firms figure among global leaders in smartphones, telecom equipment, e-commerce, AI research, etc. Thus, when decoupling from U.S. tech, China had large, well-funded domestic companies to step in. India’s tech strengths historically lay in IT services and software, not in manufacturing or products. India lacks indigenous equivalents of companies like Huawei, Alibaba, or Baidu that cover the whole range of tech. However, India does have a vibrant startup scene and big IT players (like TCS, Infosys) which are now trying to develop products. The difference is seen in AI: China has multiple companies building world-class AI models and even chips, whereas India’s AI scene is nascent and mostly applied AI (startups using AI in finance, health, etc., but not much foundational AI research). This gap means India currently relies more on open-source and collaboration to achieve independence (e.g., using Linux, Open RAN for telecom, RISC-V, etc.), effectively standing “on the shoulders” of global commons to create local solutions. China, while also leveraging open-source, invests heavily to fork and own its versions (like its own Linux distros, its own AI frameworks).
Relationship with the U.S.: Perhaps the biggest contrast is that China’s push for tech sovereignty is in direct competition with the U.S., whereas India’s push is more about hedging and self-strengthening without severing ties. China has openly aimed to lead in technologies like AI by 2030, and the United States increasingly treats that ambition as a strategic threat, responding with a sharper and more confrontational tone. India, on the other hand, benefits from U.S. support in many areas (the U.S. has even called India “a trusted tech partner”). The U.S. is unlikely to intentionally cut India off from tech, and indeed is helping integrate India into supply chains. However, India’s concern is that overdependence is dangerous regardless of intent – today friend, tomorrow who knows. So India is walking a fine line: deepening tech ties with the U.S. (for access to know-how, funding, markets) while locally developing backups in case those ties fray. One could argue India is diversifying its strategic options: e.g., adopting 5G from European vendors, chips from U.S. firms, but also nurturing homegrown talent and possibly working with Japan/Taiwan on semiconductors, etc. China’s approach is more self-contained (e.g., refusing to use foreign 5G at all, trying to eliminate U.S. components fully).
Use of Protectionism: Both countries employ protectionist measures but to different extents. China’s tech sovereignty heavily relied on protecting its domestic market – banning Western social media, blocking Google early, requiring foreign tech JVs, and subsidizing local industry until they could compete globally. India has been traditionally more open, but recently it too has used some protectionism, particularly against Chinese tech. The app bans of 2020 were a stark move, effectively a digital boycott of Chinese services. India also instituted tighter FDI rules for Chinese investors in tech startups (to prevent takeovers). For Western tech, India uses softer protectionism: for example, requiring localization (which increases cost for foreign firms), antitrust action against Google’s dominance, pushing Apple to allow alternative app stores, etc. There’s also a push to favor “Made in India” hardware in government procurement. Compared to China, India’s measures are less heavy-handed and more WTO-compatible, but nonetheless signal that pure free market access is being tempered by strategic considerations.
Global Influence and Export of Ecosystem: China, having developed a full tech ecosystem, is now exporting it through its Belt and Road Initiative’s “Digital Silk Road”. Huawei sells telecom gear globally (though recently restricted in many places), Chinese apps like TikTok and Shein (e-commerce) gained worldwide users, and even Chinese standards (like facial recognition tech or surveillance systems) are adopted by some developing nations. In essence, China’s tech independence drive has an external dimension: to get other countries to use Chinese tech and perhaps depend on it, creating a sphere of influence outside U.S. control. India, still consolidating its own ecosystem, is just beginning to think of exporting its model. One potential is exporting India’s digital public goods – for example, India has offered the UPI payment system and Aadhaar-like ID solutions to other countries in Asia and Africa. If nations adopt those, they indirectly become less tied to Western financial networks or ID systems. India also positions itself as a champion of the “Global South” in tech discussions, advocating for data equity and not letting a few big companies (or countries) dictate terms. But India’s tech exports (apart from IT services) are modest so far. Perhaps in the future, an Indian OS or app might gain traction abroad, but none has yet. So globally, China is seen as the leader of an alternate tech bloc, whereas India is seen as an important swing player that could align with the West or chart its own course.
Progress Assessment: As of mid-2020s, China is much closer to the ideal of tech sovereignty than India. China can credibly claim a fairly independent ecosystem in many areas (with the glaring exception of high-end semiconductors, where it still needs imported equipment). India is at the early stages: ideas and pilots are in place (BharOS, sovereign cloud pilot, etc.), but mass implementation lies ahead. However, India has one advantage – it can learn from China’s experience (and mistakes). For instance, India saw how difficult it was for Huawei to build an app ecosystem overnight once cut off from Google; this awareness drives India to proactively consider alternative app stores now, before any crisis forces it. India also observed how Chinese state subsidies created waste at times (e.g., redundant chip fabs that failed), so it is trying to involve private sector and global partners more to avoid purely state-driven white elephants. Culturally and politically, India will not replicate China’s model wholesale, but it is certainly taking inspiration in crafting a uniquely Indian approach to tech autonomy.
In comparing the two, an interesting point emerges: the competition between India and China is itself a factor in tech sovereignty drives. India’s concerns about Chinese cyber espionage or dominance partly fueled its own decoupling from Chinese tech (e.g., 5G ban, app bans). Conversely, China sees India (with Western backing) trying to replace it as a manufacturing hub and a technological peer in Asia, which motivates China to double-down on innovation to stay ahead. Both want to be the leading tech power in the region, if not the world. So, there is an element of India vs China rivalry here beyond just U.S. dependence. Each one’s success in building a self-reliant tech sector could have the effect of either spurring the other to work harder or trying to undercut the other (for instance, in vying for semiconductor investments or influencing global tech rules).
Global Implications and the Road Ahead
The simultaneous push by China and India to reduce U.S. tech reliance is a microcosm of a larger geopolitical reordering of the tech world. We are moving from a unipolar tech landscape (dominated by U.S. companies and standards) to a multipolar one with distinct spheres of influence. On one side, a U.S.-centric ecosystem (North America, Europe, allied countries) still thrives, but facing challenges in maintaining its global dominance. On another side, China has carved out a self-sufficient ecosystem and is trying to get other countries (especially those who feel Western tech is politically risky or too expensive) to adopt its model – for instance, Huawei helps countries set up national clouds and surveillance systems, positioning Chinese tech as turnkey solutions for developing nations. Now India is emerging as potentially a third model: a democratic open ecosystem but with strong sovereign safeguards and public platforms. If successful, India’s model could appeal to other democracies in the Global South that seek a middle path between Silicon-Langley dependence and Beijing’s state-managed approach.
For the United States and Western tech firms, these developments present both threats and opportunities. The threat is obvious: losing market share and control in two of the world’s largest markets. If Chinese and Indian alternatives flourish, American companies could find themselves edged out – as has already happened in China, and could partially happen in India if, say, an Indian cloud or OS gains traction for government contracts. Moreover, if more countries follow suit in demanding local alternatives or control (for example, some in Europe talk of “digital sovereignty” too), the addressable market for U.S. Big Tech shrinks or at least fragments. Interoperability could suffer; we might see a future where apps or devices from one bloc don’t seamlessly work in another without adjustments.
On the other hand, the situation also offers opportunities for collaboration and innovation. U.S. and India are cooperating closely on technology – the shared goal to counterbalance China’s dominance is bringing them together in areas like semiconductor supply chains, 5G/6G development, space tech, and AI ethics. American firms investing in India’s tech sector might find a huge new base for manufacturing and talent (e.g., Apple making India a second home, Intel possibly considering fabrication partnerships). For India, leveraging Western partnerships while asserting independence is a delicate dance, but if done well, it can accelerate India’s tech upskilling. For instance, by having Micron’s packaging plant and potentially an Intel design center, India gains know-how that domestic efforts might take much longer to build.
From a global innovation standpoint, a multipolar tech world could spur healthy competition. If China leads in some AI applications due to its sheer data and scale, the U.S. has to innovate faster to stay ahead – and vice versa. If India develops a great digital public service model (like UPI) that outclasses Western fintech in inclusion and cost, it might pressure global companies to adapt and improve. Multiple centers of innovation mean more experiments in governance too: China’s heavy state approach shows one set of outcomes (impressive infrastructure but at cost of freedoms), the U.S. laissez-faire led to giant private monopolies with their own downsides, and India’s collaborative-regulatory approach is yet another experiment. The world can observe and potentially adopt best practices from each.
However, there is a risk of fragmentation. We already see a form of splinternet – China’s internet is separate. If India also veers towards more localized networks and app ecosystems, global connectivity could weaken. Standard-setting could become a battleground – whose standards for AI safety, whose protocols for data sharing prevail? If Chinese tech becomes prevalent in some countries and Western tech in others, interoperability issues and cybersecurity concerns will grow. For example, if an Indian military system is built on completely Indian or allied tech, it might not communicate smoothly with another country’s system built on Chinese tech, etc. We could see a technological Cold War of sorts, where trust and alliances determine whose tech stack you buy into.
For everyday consumers and tech professionals, these developments will be interesting to navigate. In the near future, an Indian user might have a choice not just between iOS and Android, but also BharOS (if it matures) – a third ecosystem of apps and services tailored to India’s needs. A company in Asia or Africa may weigh: do we host our service on AWS, or Alibaba Cloud, or Reliance Jio’s cloud? Each choice has political and compliance implications. Sanctions resilience will become a selling point – e.g., Huawei now markets some of its products by saying they are “sanction-proof” (not reliant on U.S. components), which appeals to countries fearing U.S. sanctions. Similarly, India might market its digital public goods as neutral and open solutions free from superpower tussles.
One positive aspect is the emphasis on open-source and open standards emerging as a unifying thread. Both India and China, in their quest to avoid proprietary foreign tech, have embraced open technologies: China forked Linux for its OS; India uses Linux and advocates open APIs. The RISC-V open hardware standard is a meeting point of interest for both. This could lead to more resources poured into open-source projects by governments, which benefits the global community as well. For example, India’s OpenKylin or contributions to Linux security, or China’s open-source AI models could be valuable to others. The key is whether these remain truly open or become inward-looking.
Future of Tech Sovereignty in Asia
“Who controls the code” is indeed set to become as important as who commands armies or economies. In this regard, China and India are ensuring that the answer is: we do, for ourselves. China’s head start and assertive state-led drive have yielded a largely independent tech ecosystem that showcases the power of focused national effort – though not without ongoing challenges in the face of U.S. restrictions. India, learning from others and playing to its strengths, is crafting a sovereignty path that leverages open systems, public-private innovation, and strategic partnerships to wean itself off unilateral dependencies. Both nations, in carving out their technological sovereignty, are also reshaping the global tech order into one where multiple ecosystems coexist and compete.
For general readers and tech professionals alike, the idea of such parallel ecosystems is both intriguing and thought-provoking. It forces us to ask: will the future internet have multiple digital worlds – a Silicon-Langley world, a Shenzhen-Beijing-centered world, and a Bengaluru-delhi one – each with its own apps, clouds, and rules? Or will bridges remain strong enough to keep a degree of universality? How will innovation fare when knowledge is more siloed behind national walls, yet also spurred by competition? There are no easy answers, but one thing is clear: “technological sovereignty” is no longer just a buzzword; it’s a defining strategic objective of nations in the 2020s and beyond.
India and China, despite their many differences, share a conviction that they must stand on their own feet technologically to secure their futures. Their parallel quests for tech independence are becoming a defining subplot in the broader East-West technology realignment. As both countries build out alternative ecosystems in AI, smartphones, operating systems, cloud infrastructure, and semiconductors, they are effectively future-proofing themselves against external dominance.
For the United States, this shift signals that it can no longer assume permanent technological primacy or rely on its platforms and software as unquestioned leverage. For the rest of the world, it marks the rise of multiple technological power centers rather than a single point of control. The coming decade may result in interoperable diversity—where sovereignty is preserved without isolation—or it may further fragment into distinct digital spheres.
Whatever direction it takes, the efforts of India and China to reduce their dependence on U.S. technology will shape how innovation, access, and digital power are distributed globally for years to come.